A characterization of the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chun, Youngsub; Mitra, Manipushpak; Mutuswami, Suresh
• 署名单位: Seoul National University (SNU); Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; University of Leicester
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2015.04.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 486-490
• 关键词: Queueing problem; Symmetrically balanced VCG rule; axiomatic characterization; Simple proof

摘要

We characterize the symmetrically balanced VCG rule in the queueing problem using the axioms of outcome efficiency, budget balance, equal treatment of equals, Pareto indifference, together with a weakening of strategy-proofness, upward-invariance. (C) 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.