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作者：Azar, Pablo D.; Kleinberg, Robert; Weinberg, S. Matthew
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT); Cornell University; Princeton University
摘要：Prophet inequalities have recently become a fundamental tool in the design of sequential and multi-dimensional mechanisms in Bayesian settings. However, existing mechanisms- as well as the underlying prophet inequalities behind their analysis-require sophisticated information about the distribution from which inputs are drawn. Our goal in this work is to design prior-independent sequential and multi-dimensional mechanisms. To this end, we first design prophet inequalities that require knowing ...
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作者：Kim, Duk Gyoo
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：This paper studies infinite-horizon sequential bargaining among n >= 3 players in which a proposer is randomly selected from the pool of potential proposers. If the proposal is rejected, the current and previous proposers are excluded from the pool of potential proposers, and the game moves on to the next round until every player has had the same number of opportunities to be the proposer. To analyze the model with a particular time dependency within each sequence of n rounds (a cycle), I char...
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作者：Tsakas, Elias
作者单位：Maastricht University
摘要：An investigator is interested in arbitrarily approximating a subject's latent beliefs in obviously dominant strategies (Li, 2017). We prove that Karni's ascending mechanism (Karni, 2009) does not have an obviously dominant strategy. Thus, we introduce the novel descending Karni mechanism which always has obviously dominant strategies. Furthermore, under the assumption that the subject chooses an obviously dominant strategy, the true beliefs can be approximated with arbitrary precision with our...
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作者：Bahel, Eric; Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University; University of Windsor
摘要：The job scheduling problem is a classic operations research problem in which agents have jobs to be executed by machines in given time slots, with each machine being able to process only one job at a time. We study this problem using cooperative game theory, focusing on how to divide the minimum cost (of executing all jobs) between the agents. First, we characterize the set of stable allocations, which all charge only users whose jobs are executed in peak-demand time periods. Second, we introd...
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作者：Klumpp, Tilman; Konrad, Kai A.; Solomon, Adam
作者单位：University of Alberta; Max Planck Society; University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We study Colonel Blotto games with sequential battles and a majoritarian objective. For a large class of contest success functions, the equilibrium is unique and characterized by an even split: Each battle that is reached before one of the players wins a majority of battles is allocated the same amount of resources from the player's overall budget. As a consequence, a player's chance of winning any particular battle is independent of the battlefield and of the number of victories and losses th...
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作者：Elskamp, Rebecca; Kirkegaard, Rene
作者单位：University of Guelph
摘要：We argue that auctions with multi-unit demand can be used to experimentally conduct new and novel tests of auction theory. The focus of the paper is on changes in bidding behavior as the auction is scaled up by adding more bidders and increasing both the demand per bidder and supply of the auctioned good. We identify uniquely tractable environments and obtain clear cut theoretical comparative statics in these settings. This leads to the construction of uniform price auctions of different scale...
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作者：Piermont, Evan; Teper, Roee
作者单位：University of London; Royal Holloway University London; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：We note that in environments such as exploration problems, in which agents have to choose a single action out of several in each period, an agent's preferences over different strategies can only reveal the margins of her beliefs. However, classical notions of Bayesian updating regard the joint distribution. We develop the relevant environment and tools to solve this issue: We introduce a necessary and sufficient condition on the margins of an agent's beliefs to be consistent with an exchangeab...
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作者：Chen, Yan; Kesten, Onur
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; Carnegie Mellon University; Tsinghua University
摘要：Since 2001, many Chinese provinces have transitioned from a sequential to a parallel school choice or college admissions mechanism. Inspired by this natural experiment, we evaluate the sequential (immediate acceptance, IA), parallel (PA), and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms in the laboratory. We find that participants are most likely to reveal their preferences truthfully under DA, followed by PA and then DA. While stability comparisons also follow the same order, efficiency comparisons va...
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作者：Haenni, Simon
作者单位：University of Zurich
摘要：Many important life goals require repeated confrontation with competitors. Losing in such competitions may discourage individuals and make them postpone further competitions, thereby harming future prospects. I use data on 44,799 amateur tennis players, who are randomly paired in repeated competitions, to study the causal effect of losing on the time to the next tournament participation. Results show that individuals wait on average 10% longer to enroll again after losing. Furthermore, losing ...
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作者：Turhan, Bertan
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：This paper examines the effects of partition structure of schools on students' welfare and on incentives students face under the iterative student optimal stable mechanism (I-SOSM), introduced by Manjunath and Turhan (2016), in divided school enrollment systems. I find that when school partition gets coarser students' welfare weakly increases under the I-SOSM for any number of iterations. I also show that under coarser school partitions the I-SOSM becomes weakly less manipulable for students (...
