Belief-updating rule and sequential reciprocity

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jiang, Lianjie; Wu, Jiabin
• 署名单位: University of Oregon
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2018.11.004
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 770-780
• 关键词: Psychological game theory; Higher order beliefs; Belief-updating rule; Sequential reciprocity

摘要

We revisit Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger's (2004) model of reciprocity in sequential games. One important assumption they make is that players' perception of their opponents' kindness depends on their most updated beliefs at their decision nodes along the game. We argue that this is not always the case. We propose a modified belief-updating rule that categorizes beliefs by whether perceived kindness is calculated using their most updated forms. We use a simple example to demonstrate how equilibrium predictions differ for the new rule compared to the original one. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.