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作者：Gonczarowski, Yannai A.; Nisan, Noam; Ostrovsky, Rafail; Rosenbaum, Will
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Max Planck Society; Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Microsoft; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Tel Aviv University
摘要：In 1976, Knuth asked whether the worst-case running-time of the Gale-Shapley algorithm for the Stable Marriage Problem can be improved when non-sequential access to the input is allowed. Partial negative answers were given by Ng and Hirschberg and as part of Segal's general communication-complexity analysis. We give a far simpler, yet significantly more powerful, argument showing that Omega(n(2)) Boolean queries of any type are required for finding a stable - or even approximately stable - mar...
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作者：Voorneveld, Mark
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：For strategic games, the Nash equilibrium concept is axiomatized using three properties: (i) if the difference between two games is 'strategically irrelevant', then their solutions are the same; (ii) if a player has a strategy with a constant payoff, this player need not settle for less in any solution of the game; (iii) if all players agree that a certain strategy profile is optimal, then this strategy profile is a solution of the game. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Blume, Andreas; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung
作者单位：University of Arizona; Lehigh University; Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：Theory suggests that garbling may improve the transmission of private information. A simple garbling procedure, randomized response, has shown promise in the field. We provide the first complete analysis of randomized response as a game and implement it as an experiment. We find in our experiment that randomized response increases truth-telling and, importantly, does so in instances where being truthful adversely affects posterior beliefs. Our theoretical analysis also reveals, however, that r...
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作者：Miura, Shintaro
作者单位：Kanagawa University
摘要：This paper investigates the relationship between media manipulation, the strategic suppression of relevant information by mass media, and self-mediatization, the strategic exploitation of media coverage by candidates, in elections. In the model, a voter cannot directly observe the policies proposed by two office-motivated candidates. The voter learns this information through media reports before voting takes place, while the media outlet suppresses some of this information. Because the voter's...
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作者：Ali, S. Nageeb; Bohren, J. Aislinn
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or deliberating before voting. Our main result is that if the committee plays its preferred equilibrium and the Principal uses a threshold voting rule, then she does not gain from banning deliberation. We show using examples how she can gain if she can choose t...
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作者：Balkenborg, Dieter; Vermeulen, Dries
作者单位：University of Exeter; Maastricht University
摘要：It has been an open conjecture in the theory of non-cooperative games that Nash equilibrium is universal for the collection of (non-empty) compact semi-algebraic sets, meaning that for every such set there is a game whose set of Nash equilibria is homeomorphic to the given set. In this paper we prove this conjecture. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Gui, Zhengqing; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig; Zhao, Xiaojian
作者单位：Wuhan University; University of Mannheim; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; Monash University; The Chinese University of Hong Kong, Shenzhen
摘要：This paper studies a financial contracting problem where a firm privately observes its cash flow and faces a limited liability constraint. The firm's collateral is piecemeal divisible and can only be liquidated continuously by resorting to the service of a costly third party, typically associated with bankruptcy. In this situation, multi-class collateralized debt is optimal, in which the firm makes several debt-like promises with a seniority structure. The decision over continuous and piecemea...
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作者：Newton, Jonathan; Wait, Andrew; Angus, Simon D.
作者单位：Kyoto University; University of Sydney; Monash University
摘要：Modeling firms as networks of employees, occasional collaborative decision making around the office watercooler changes long run employee behavior (corporate culture). The culture that emerges in a given team of employees depends on team size and on how the team is connected to the wider firm. The implications of the model for organizational structure are explored and related to trends in the design of hierarchies. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Battigalli, Pierpaolo; Dufwenberg, Martin; Smith, Alec
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University; University of Arizona; University of Gothenburg; Leibniz Association; Ifo Institut; Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University
摘要：Frustration, anger, and blame have important consequences for economic and social behavior, concerning for example monopoly pricing, contracting, bargaining, violence, and politics. Drawing on insights from psychology, we develop a formal approach to exploring how frustration and anger, via blame and aggression, shape interaction and outcomes in a class of two-stage games. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Lambert, Nicolas S.; Marple, Adrian; Shoham, Yoav
作者单位：Stanford University; Alphabet Inc.; Google Incorporated; Stanford University
摘要：We generalize the modified multiselves approach of Piccione and Rubinstein to (multiplayer) games of imperfect recall. Four solution concepts are introduced: the multiselves agent equilibrium, the multiselves Nash equilibrium, the multiselves sequential equilibrium, and the multiselves perfect equilibrium. These modified equilibrium notions satisfy two important properties not fulfilled by the original ones. First, they always exist: every finite extensive game has at least one multiselves equ...
