Group behaviour in tacit coordination games with focal points - an experimental investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Sitzia, Stefania; Zheng, Jiwei
• 署名单位: University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.08.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 461-478
• 关键词: groups; COORDINATION; Payoff-irrelevant cues; cognition

摘要

This paper reports an experimental investigation of Schelling's theory of focal points that compares group and individual behaviour. We find that, when players' interests are perfectly aligned, groups more often choose the salient option and achieve higher coordination success than individuals. However, in games with conflicts of interest, groups do not always perform better than individuals, especially when the degree of conflict is substantial. We also find that groups outperform individuals when identifying the solution to the coordination problem requires some level of cognitive sophistication. Finally, players that successfully identify the solution to this game also achieve greater coordination rates than other players in games with a low degree of conflict. This result raises the question of whether finding the focal point is more a matter of logic rather than imagination as Schelling argued. (C) 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.