Price dispersion in stationary networked markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Talamas, Eduard
• 署名单位: University of Pennsylvania
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.005
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 247-264
• 关键词: price dispersion; non-cooperative bargaining; Trading frictions; Networked markets; Stationary markets; Strategic choice of partners

摘要

Different sellers often sell the same good at different prices. Using a strategic bargaining model, I characterize how the equilibrium prices of a good depend on the interaction between its sellers' costs, its buyers' values, and a network capturing various frictions associated with trading it. In contrast to the standard random-matching model of bargaining in stationary markets, I allow agents to strategically choose whom to make offers to, which qualitatively changes how the network shapes prices. As in the random matching model, the market decomposes into different submarkets, and in the limit as bargaining frictions vanish the law of one price holds within but not across them. But strategic choice of partners changes both how the market decomposes into different submarkets and the determinants of each submarket's price. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.