Limits of correlation in repeated games with bounded memory

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bavly, Gilad; Peretz, Ron
• 署名单位: Bar Ilan University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.03.003
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 131-145
• 关键词: Repeated games; Bounded complexity; Equilibrium payoffs; Bounded recall; Finite automata; Concealed correlation

摘要

We study repeated games in which each player i is restricted to (mixtures of) strategies that can recall up to ki stages of history. Characterizing the set of equilibrium payoffs boils down to identifying the individually rational level (punishment level) of each player. In contrast to the classic folk theorem, in which players are unrestricted, punishing a bounded player may involve correlation between the punishers' actions. We show that the extent of such correlation is at most proportional to the ratio between the recall capacity of the punishers and the punishee. Our result extends to a few variations of the model, as well as to finite automata. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.