The existence of a unique core partition in coalition formation games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Inal, Hakan
• 署名单位: Volvo
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.01.009
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 215-231
• 关键词: Coalition formation; core; STABILITY; matching; algorithm

摘要

In coalition formation games with arbitrary collection of permissible coalitions, a top/stable-coalition condition is sufficient for the existence of a unique core partition, strengthening uniqueness results both in Pycia (2012) and in Banerjee et al. (2001). (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.