-
作者：Goyal, Sanjeev; Heidari, Hoda; Kearns, Michael
摘要：We develop a game-theoretic framework for the study of competition between firms who have budgets to seed the initial adoption of their products by consumers located in a social network. We identify a general property of the adoption dynamics - namely, decreasing returns to local adoption - for which the inefficiency of resource use at equilibrium (the Price of Anarchy) is uniformly bounded above, across all networks. We also show that if this property is violated, even the Price of Stability ...
-
作者：Brocas, Isabelle; Carrillo, Juan D.; Combs, T. Dalton; Kodaverdian, Niree
作者单位：University of Southern California; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：How does value-based reasoning develop and how different this development is from one domain to another? We propose a novel experimental design where children 5 to 11 years old make pairwise choices in the Goods (toys), Social (sharing between self and other), and Risk (lotteries) domains, and we evaluate the consistency of their choices. The development of consistency across domains cannot be fully accounted for by existing developmental paradigms such as transitive reasoning, attentional con...
-
作者：Mechtenberg, Lydia; Tyran, Jean-Robert
作者单位：University of Hamburg; University of Vienna; University of Copenhagen; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要：The efficiency of committee voting and referenda with common-interest issues critically depends on voter motivation, i.e., on voters' willingness to cast an informed vote. If voters are motivated, voting may result in smart choices because of information aggregation but if voters remain ignorant, delegating decision making to an expert may yield better outcomes. We experimentally study a common-interest situation in which we vary voters' information cost and the competence of the expert. We fi...
-
作者：Dong, Lu; Falvey, Rod; Luckraz, Shravan
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University; Bond University; University of Nottingham Ningbo China
摘要：We propose and experimentally test a mechanism for a class of principal-agent problems in which agents can observe each others' efforts. In this mechanism each player costlessly assigns a share of the pie to each of the other players, after observing their contributions, and the final distribution is determined by these assignments. We show that efficiency can be achieved under this simple mechanism and, in a controlled laboratory experiment, we find that players reward others based on relativ...
-
作者：Bomze, Immanuel M.; Rinaldi, Francesco; Bulo, Samuel Rota
作者单位：University of Vienna; University of Padua
摘要：Infection and Immunization Dynamics (INFIMMDYN) is a class of game dynamics introduced some seven years ago in this journal (Rota Bulb and Bomze, 2011). Here we close an up to now unnoticed lacuna in the arguments for convergence of Pure INFlMMDYN in partnership games, thereby enforcing all results in the previous paper (Rota Bulb and Bomze, 2011) in a rigorous manner. (C) 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
-
作者：Bond, Eric W.; Samuelson, Larry
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Yale University
摘要：We study bargaining between a country and a multinational firm over the firm's entry to sell a patented product when the firm has private information about its profits and the country has the threat of issuing a compulsory license (CL). We assume the CL expands the surplus for some firm types, so that efficiency calls for all firms with sufficiently high valuations to enter immediately and those with lower valuations to wait for a CL We establish the existence of two types of equilibria, depen...
-
作者：Coutts, Alexander
作者单位：Universidade Nova de Lisboa
摘要：Optimistic beliefs affect important areas of economic decision making, yet direct knowledge on how belief biases operate remains limited. To better understand these biases I introduce a theoretical framework that trades off anticipatory benefits against two potential costs of forming biased beliefs: (1) material costs which result from poor decisions, of Brunnermeier and Parker (2005), and (2) direct psychological costs of distorting reality, of Bracha and Brown (2012). The experiment exploits...
-
作者：Brandl, Florian; Brandt, Felix; Hofbauer, Johannes
作者单位：Technical University of Munich
摘要：We consider randomized public good mechanisms with optional participation. Preferences over lotteries are modeled using skew-symmetric bilinear (SSB) utility functions, a generalization of classic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions. We show that every welfare-maximizing mechanism entices participation and that the converse holds under additional assumptions. As a corollary, we obtain a characterization of an attractive randomized voting rule that satisfies Condorcet-consistency and enti...
-
作者：Fehr, Dietmar; Sutter, Matthias
作者单位：Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg; Max Planck Society; University of Cologne; University of Innsbruck
摘要：Human communication often involves a large amount of gossiping about others. Here we study in an experiment whether gossip affects the efficiency of human interactions in an experimental trust game. Third parties can send unverifiable messages about a trustee's behavior to a trustor. We find that this form of gossip increases trust and trustworthiness compared to a situation without a third party. However, a large part of this increase is due to the mere observation of trustees through third p...
-
作者：Ortner, Juan
作者单位：Boston University
摘要：This paper constructs a continuous-time model of bilateral bargaining to study how fluctuations in bargaining power affect the outcomes of negotiations. The paper deals with the technical complexities that arise when modeling games in continuous time by building strategy restrictions into the equilibrium definition. These restrictions select a unique equilibrium, which is characterized by a system of ordinary differential equations. This unique equilibrium corresponds to the limiting subgame p...
