Combinatorial clock auctions: Price direction and performance

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Munro, David R.; Rassenti, Stephen J.
• 署名单位: Middlebury College; Chapman University System; Chapman University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2019.07.001
• 发表日期: 2019
• 页码: 195-217
• 关键词: Combinatorial auctions; EFFICIENCY; experiment

摘要

The lack of price guidance towards efficiency relevant packages in ascending combinatorial clock auctions (ACCA) can lead to a low-efficiency allocation of goods. We propose a descending price combinatorial clock auction (DCCA) with a newly devised pricing strategy to improve on this problem. Using agent-based simulations we document that the DCCA provides significant improvements over the ACCA and we are able to understand in which environments these improvements are likely to be the strongest. We test these predictions in the laboratory with human subjects and find evidence that the DCCA generates improvements in auction efficiency and revenue. (C) 2019 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.