Matching strategic agents on a two-sided platform

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Aoyagi, Masaki; Yoo, Seung Han
• 署名单位: University of Osaka; Korea University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.06.007
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 271-296
• 关键词: Assortative; screening; Subscription; Two-sided Market; revenue maximization

摘要

A platform offers sellers and buyers trading opportunities by creating one-to-one matches between them. A matching mechanism specifies subscription fees and the probabilities with which each seller type is matched with each buyer type. When the subscribers are fully strategic in their interactions with their matched partners, the optimal mechanism may not employ socially efficient positive assortative matching (PAM) but instead focus on the extraction of the agents' informational rents. In alternative scenarios in which the platform exercises stronger control over the subscribers' interactions, the optimal mechanism employs PAM but may create distortions by blocking some efficient trans-actions.(c) 2022 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Inc.