Equilibria of nonatomic anonymous games

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Cerreia-Vioglio, Simone; Maccheroni, Fabio; Schmeidler, David
• 署名单位: Bocconi University; Bocconi University; Tel Aviv University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.05.011
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 110-131
• 关键词: Nonatomic games; Large games; Nash equilibrium; self-confirming equilibrium; Peer-confirming equilibrium; Berk-Nash equilibrium

摘要

We define a new notion of equilibrium for nonatomic anonymous games, termed epsilon-estimated equilibrium, and prove its existence for any positive s. This notion encompasses and brings to nonatomic games recent concepts of equilibrium such as self-confirming, peer-confirming, and Berk-Nash. This augmented scope is our main motivation. Our approach also resolves some conceptual problems present in Schmeidler (1973) pointed out by Shapley. (C) 2022 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc.