Bargaining over a jointly produced pie: The effect of the production function on bargaining outcomes

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Takeuchi, Ai; Veszteg, Robert F.; Kamijo, Yoshio; Funaki, Yukihiko
• 署名单位: Ritsumeikan University; Waseda University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2022.03.016
• 发表日期: 2022
• 页码: 169-198
• 关键词: Unstructured bargaining; Earned wealth; production function; Proportional solution; Nash bargaining solution; laboratory experiment

摘要

Using experimental data, we show that the characteristics of the joint production process have a notable impact on the distribution of bargaining agreements. The setting in which the jointly produced surplus is expressed to be proportional to individual inputs leads to significantly more proportional bargaining agreements. This is in contrast to the setting in which the surplus is expressed as an additive constant, where bargaining agreements are more in line with the Nash bargaining solution. (c) 2022 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.