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作者：Chatterjee, Kalyan; Chaturvedi, Rakesh
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in Luce and Raiffa (1957), is the point where the negotiation curve - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs c...
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作者：Qin, Dan
作者单位：Nagoya University of Commerce & Business
摘要：This article explores the behavioral implications of different roles of the reference alternative. We delineate the boundaries of three reference -dependent choice models, each associated with distinct behavioral patterns: the endowment effect model, the loss aversion model, and the reference -dependent shortlisting model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that the intersections of these models correspond to meaningful special cases within each model.
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作者：Chen, Yanlin; Hu, Audrey; Zhang, Jun
作者单位：Nanjing Audit University; City University of Hong Kong; University of Technology Sydney
摘要：We study an optimal information/mechanism design problem for selling an object to a number of asymmetric, privately informed bidders in which the winning bidder competes with a third party under differentiated Cournot competition afterwards. We show how to decompose the problem into two sub -problems: Bayesian persuasion and standard mechanism design. Full disclosure of the winner's marginal cost emerges as the unique optimal information policy, combined with allocating the auctioned object to...
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作者：Du, Ninghua; Shahriar, Quazi
作者单位：Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; California State University System; San Diego State University
摘要：In a moral hazard framework, an agent considers undertaking a task of uncertain difficulty. An immediate disclosure of the task's difficulty by the principal convinces the agent to perform only easy tasks. By contrast, information design theory predicts that delayed disclosure can induce the agent to continue working even when the work turns out to be challenging. Our experimental evidence confirms that delayed disclosure outperforms immediate disclosure and no disclosure, as theory predicts, ...
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作者：Blom, Danny; Smeulders, Bart; Spieksma, Frits
作者单位：Eindhoven University of Technology
摘要：Kidney exchange programs (KEPs) increase kidney transplantation by facilitating the exchange of incompatible donors. Increasing the scale of KEPs leads to more opportunities for transplants. Collaboration between transplant organizations (agents) is thus desirable. As agents are primarily interested in providing transplants for their own patients, collaboration requires balancing individual and common objectives. In this paper, we consider ex-post strategic behavior, where agents can modify a ...
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作者：Carpenter, Jeffrey; Robbett, Andrea
作者单位：Middlebury College
摘要：This paper extends the literature on structural estimation of social preferences to account for the desire to adhere to social norms and hide one's true intentions via moral wiggle room. We conduct an experiment to test whether accounting for normatively appropriate behavior allows us to distinguish between preference types who care about outcomes versus adhering to social norms and whether the introduction of moral wiggle room undermines the stability of social preference estimates. We find t...
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作者：Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A.
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Gottingen
摘要：Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation in such a setting, i.e., a prisoner's dilemma game, with a passive third party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying a within-subjects setting, we compare cooperation under anonymity and social information, as personal characteristics are commonly known in real-life relations. Results show that the presence of a negative externality par...
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作者：Afodjo, Nabil; Pongou, Roland
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; University of Ottawa
摘要：We study efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies, where each agent only cares about trading with a desired number of partners from the opposite side. For both homogeneous and heterogeneous economies, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that ensures the efficiency of all pairwise stable matchings. In addition, we provide a sufficient condition for maximality in heterogeneous economies. These conditions have implications for the design of anonymous markets that fun...
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作者：Hossain, Tanjim; Okui, Ryo
作者单位：University of Toronto; University of Tokyo; University of Tokyo
摘要：This paper demonstrates the importance of considering incorrect perceptions of variance in characterizing people's belief formation rules when they suffer from correlation neglect. Using laboratory experiments, we elicit posterior beliefs regarding the realization of a random variable where some signals that a subject receives are correlated. Subjects in our experiments consistently neglect correlation and also misperceive signal variance when updating their beliefs. We present behavioral mode...
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作者：Peralta, Esteban
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：It is well known that in the absence of transfers, stable matchings are positive assortative when agents' preferences are strictly monotonic in each other's types and types are commonly known. Instead, monotonicity is consistent with the existence of stable matchings that exhibit negative sorting when types on one side of the market are private information. This paper sheds light on the scope and meaning of this consistency by showing that within familiar monotonic markets we cannot conclude t...
