-
作者：Sethi, Ravideep; Yoo, Wonseok
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：We consider non-cooperative bargaining over a fixed surplus between two groups that may differ in size and the supermajority threshold they employ for within-group ratification. We find that total allocation to a group does not depend on group size and increases with the supermajority threshold. We use the Gini coefficient to study within-group inequality as an outcome of interest and find that inequality increases with group size and decreases with the supermajority threshold. Finally, we stu...
-
作者：Durand, Francois; Mace, Antonin; Nunez, Matias
作者单位：Nokia Corporation; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Paris School of Economics; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
摘要：We study how voting rules shape voter coordination in large three -candidate elections. We consider three rules, that differ on the number of candidates that voters can support: Plurality (one), Anti -Plurality (two) and Approval Voting (one or two). We show that the Condorcet winner is always elected at some equilibrium under Approval Voting, and that this rule provides better welfare guarantees than Plurality. We then numerically study a dynamic process of political t & acirc;tonnement which...
-
作者：Mimun, Hlafo Alfie; Quattropani, Matteo; Scarsini, Marco
作者单位：Luiss Guido Carli University; Sapienza University Rome
摘要：We consider finite two -player normal form games with random payoffs. Player A's payoffs are i.i.d. from a uniform distribution. Given p is an element of [0 , 1], for any action profile, player B's payoff coincides with player A's payoff with probability p and is i.i.d. from the same uniform distribution with probability 1 - p . This model interpolates the model of i.i.d. random payoff used in most of the literature and the model of random potential games. First we study the number of pure Nas...
-
作者：Atay, Ata; Trudeau, Christian
作者单位：University of Barcelona; University of Windsor
摘要：We study queueing problems with an endogenous number of machines, the novelty being that coalitions not only choose how to queue, but on how many machines. After minimizing the processing costs and machine costs, we share the proceeds of this cooperation, and study the existence of stable allocations. First, we study queueing problems, and examine how to share the total cost. We provide an upper bound and a lower bound on the cost of a machine to guarantee the non-emptiness of the core. Next, ...
-
作者：Combe, Julien; Schlegel, Jan Christoph
作者单位：Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Ecole Polytechnique; City St Georges, University of London
摘要：We consider a reallocation problem with priorities where each agent is initially endowed with a house and is willing to exchange it but each house has a priority ordering over the agents of the market. In this setting, it is well known that there is no individually rational and stable mechanism. As a result, the literature has introduced a modified stability notion called n0 stability. In contrast to college admission problems, in which priorities are present but there is no initial endowment,...
-
作者：Chaves, Isaias N.; Ichihashi, Shota
作者单位：Northwestern University; Queens University - Canada
摘要：A seller faces a pool of potential bidders that changes over time. She can delay the auction to have a thicker market later on. The seller imposes static distortions (through her choice of reserve prices) and dynamic distortions (through her choice of market thickness). Under a condition on types that generalizes increasing hazard rates, we show that (i) regulating only static distortions can harm efficiency; (ii) when regulating only dynamic distortions, a social planner should reduce market ...
-
作者：Jacquemet, Nicolas; Luchini, Stephane; Shogren, Jason F.; Zylbersztejn, Adam
作者单位：Paris School of Economics; Aix-Marseille Universite; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); University of Wyoming; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Ecole Normale Superieure de Lyon (ENS de LYON); Universite Claude Bernard Lyon 1; Universite Jean Monnet; Universite Lyon 2; emlyon business school
摘要：Under incomplete contracts, the mutual belief in reciprocity facilitates how traders create value through economic exchange. Creating such beliefs among strangers can be challenging even when they are allowed to communicate, because communication is cheap. In this paper, we first extend the literature showing that a truth-telling oath increases honesty to a sequential trust game with pre-play, fixed-form, and cheap-talk communication. Our results confirm that the oath creates more trust and co...
-
作者：Igarashi, Ayumi; Kawase, Yasushi; Suksompong, Warut; Sumita, Hanna
作者单位：University of Tokyo; National University of Singapore; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have preferences over the teams. We focus on guaranteeing envy-freeness up to one participant (EF1) for the teams together with a stability condition for both sides. We show that an allocation satisfying EF1, swap stability, and individual stability always exists a...
-
作者：Arad, Ayala; Penczynski, Stefan P.
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; University of East Anglia; University of East Anglia; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We experimentally investigate behavior and reasoning in various competitive resource allocation games with large strategy spaces. In the experiment, a team of two players plays as one entity against other teams. Team members communicate with one another before choosing a strategy. We analyze their messages using three different classification approaches and find that the vast majority of players think in terms of dimensions or characteristics of strategies rather than in terms of individual el...
-
作者：Zhou, Beixi
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：I study a two -player continuous -time dynamic coordination game with observational learning. Each player has one opportunity to make a reversible investment with an uncertain return that is realized only when both players invest. Each player learns about the potential return by observing a private signal and the actions of the other player. In equilibrium, players' roles as leader and follower are endogenously determined. Information aggregates in a single burst initially, then gradually thro...
