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作者：Sun, Yang; Zhao, Wei
作者单位：Renmin University of China
摘要：In a multi -agent contracting problem, agents are linked in performance through two channels, effort spillover, governed by spillover network, and risk correlation, governed by risk structure. Assigning compensation weights on peers' performances can not only filter out common risks but also alter agent's incentives. We study how the network and risk structure jointly determine the optimal linear contract. First, the relative compensation sensitivity is determined by ratio of the dot product, ...
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作者：Fey, Mark
作者单位：University of Rochester
摘要：In this paper, we give an example of a statement concerning two-player zero -sum games which is undecidable, meaning that it can neither be proven or disproven by the standard axioms of mathematics. Earlier work has shown that there exist paradoxical two-player zero -sum games with unbounded payoffs, in which a standard calculation of the two players' expected utilities of a mixed strategy profile yield a positive sum. We show that whether or not a modified version of this paradoxical situatio...
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作者：Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kajackaite, Agne
作者单位：University of Lausanne; University of Milan
摘要：This paper studies whether malfunctioning (or unenforced) institutions erode good behavior. We use a large-scale online experiment, in which participants play a repeated observed cheating game. When we ask participants to report honestly and promise no control, we find low cheating rates. When control of truthful reporting is introduced, low cheating rates remain. In our main treatment with a malfunctioning institution, participants do not know whether they are in the treatment with or without...
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作者：Bando, Keisuke; Kawasaki, Ryo
作者单位：Keio University; Institute of Science Tokyo; Tokyo Institute of Technology
摘要：We analyze a multi-period matching market where matching between agents is decided for each time period. To analyze this situation, we embed the situation into the framework of many- to-many matching with contracts where the contract includes the time period at which the matching occurs. While a general stability concept is already defined for the matching with contracts framework, in a multi-period matching model, a stable outcome may not exist when contracts exhibit complementarities across ...
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作者：Liu, Ting; Ma, Ching-to Albert
作者单位：State University of New York (SUNY) System; Stony Brook University; Boston University
摘要：We study credence goods in a general model. A consumer may suffer a loss which is a continuous random variable. Privately observing the loss value, an expert can provide a repair at a price to eliminate the consumer's loss. All perfect-Bayesian equilibria are inefficient, in that some losses are not repaired. In closed form, we derive a pooling equilibrium (where losses are inferred to be in an interval), and a separating equilibrium (where losses are precisely inferred). If the expert can acq...
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作者：Fries, Tilman
作者单位：University of Munich
摘要：This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some lies are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model can explain experimental data from previous studies, particularly on partial lying, where individuals lie to gain a non-payoff maximizing amount. I discuss the relationship with theoretical models of lying that c...
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作者：Bauch, Gerrit; Riedel, Frank
作者单位：University of Bielefeld; University of Johannesburg
摘要：We investigate a widely used mechanism to resolve disputes among business partners, known as Texas Shoot -Out, under Knightian uncertainty. For a non -degenerate range of intermediate valuations, an ambiguity -averse divider truthfully reveals their valuation in equilibrium. As a consequence, the resulting outcome is efficient, in contrast to the Bayesian case. With equal shares, both agents prefer ex -ante to be the chooser and would like to avoid triggering the mechanism in the first place.
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作者：Armouti-Hansen, Jesper; Cassar, Lea; Dereky, Anna; Engl, Florian
作者单位：University of Bonn; University of Regensburg; Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology Domain; ETH Zurich; University of Regensburg
摘要：Many jobs serve a social purpose beyond profit maximization, contributing positively to society. This paper uses a modified principal -agent gift -exchange game with positive externality (prosocial treatment) to study how workers' prosocial motivation interacts with the use of efficiency wages in stimulating effort. We find that prosocial motivation and efficiency wages are independent in stimulating effort: compared to a standard gift -exchange game (GE treatment), the presence of the externa...
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作者：Munoz, Manuel
摘要：I study the impact identity change (assimilation) has on economic mobility. I experimentally assign people to different group identities, majority or minority, before they interact in a social coordination setting. In equilibrium, minority assimilators achieve economic mobility by integrating with the majority. In the experiment, assimilators are discriminated against and cannot integrate, if majority members encounter conformists (non -assimilators) in the minority. Thus, assimilators fail to...
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作者：Shorrer, Ran I.; Sovago, Sandor
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; University of Groningen
摘要：College applicants often make dominated choices even when a strategically simple mechanism such as deferred acceptance is in place. We study Hungarian college admissions, where deferred acceptance is used, and still many college applicants make revealed dominated choices: they forgo the free opportunity to receive a tuition waiver. Using two empirical strategies, we show that when admission with a tuition waiver becomes more selective, applicants make more revealed dominated choices. Our resul...
