Efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Afodjo, Nabil; Pongou, Roland
• 署名单位: Queens University - Canada; University of Ottawa
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.04.003
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 184-195
• 关键词: Anonymous two-sided economies; Pairwise stable matchings; EFFICIENCY; maximality; Structural conditions

摘要

We study efficiency and maximality in anonymous two-sided economies, where each agent only cares about trading with a desired number of partners from the opposite side. For both homogeneous and heterogeneous economies, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition that ensures the efficiency of all pairwise stable matchings. In addition, we provide a sufficient condition for maximality in heterogeneous economies. These conditions have implications for the design of anonymous markets that function optimally without the continuous intervention of a social planner.