Gender and cooperation in the presence of negative externalities

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Haucap, Justus; Heldman, Christina; Rau, Holger A.
• 署名单位: Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; University of Gottingen
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.06.007
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 148-169
• 关键词: cooperation; experiment; Gender differences; Negative externality; social information; collusion

摘要

Social dilemmas often impose negative externalities on third parties. We experimentally analyze gender differences in cooperation in such a setting, i.e., a prisoner's dilemma game, with a passive third party that may be harmed when active players mutually cooperate. Applying a within-subjects setting, we compare cooperation under anonymity and social information, as personal characteristics are commonly known in real-life relations. Results show that the presence of a negative externality particularly affects guilt-averse women, who cooperate less often independently of the degree of information they receive. No gender difference is found absent negative externalities.