Optimal auction design with aftermarket Cournot competition

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chen, Yanlin; Hu, Audrey; Zhang, Jun
• 署名单位: Nanjing Audit University; City University of Hong Kong; University of Technology Sydney
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.003
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 54-65
• 关键词: Mechanism design; Bayesian persuasion; auctions; Aftermarket; Cournot competition

摘要

We study an optimal information/mechanism design problem for selling an object to a number of asymmetric, privately informed bidders in which the winning bidder competes with a third party under differentiated Cournot competition afterwards. We show how to decompose the problem into two sub -problems: Bayesian persuasion and standard mechanism design. Full disclosure of the winner's marginal cost emerges as the unique optimal information policy, combined with allocating the auctioned object to the bidder with the highest virtual surplus. Bidders' signaling incentives increase the seller's expected revenue and lower discriminatory reserve prices in the optimal mechanism, improving ex post efficiency, measured by the probability of no -sale.