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作者：Rohde, Linnea Marie
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：An election with full turnout is supposed to achieve an outcome that perfectly reflects the majority's preference. This result requires voters to be perfectly informed about their preferences and to vote accordingly. I show that incentivizing participation with an abstention fine does not necessarily incentivize information acquisition. While a small abstention fine always increases information acquisition compared to Voluntary Voting, a high abstention fine that achieves full turnout increase...
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作者：Gusev, Vasily; Nesterov, Alexander; Reshetov, Mikhail; Suzdaltsev, Alex
作者单位：HSE University (National Research University Higher School of Economics); Lomonosov Moscow State University
摘要：In a variety of economic situations discrete agents choose one resource among several available resources and, once admitted to the resource of choice, divide it among fellow agents admitted there. The amount of the resource an agent gets is proportional to her relative ability to acquire this particular resource, what we refer to as an agent's weight at the resource. The relevant applications include students self-selecting into colleges, politicians self-selecting into races, and athletes se...
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作者：Thomson, William
摘要：We formulate and study the requirement on an allocation rule that no agent should be able to benefit by artificially augmenting their endowment. This can be either through simply exaggeration or through a transfer of resources from outside of the current trading partners, resources that have to be returned after the rule is applied and the agent has received their assignment. We show that the Walrasian rule is not augmentation-proof even on standard domains. More seriously, no efficient select...
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作者：Argenton, Cedric; Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta; Mueller, Wieland
作者单位：Tilburg University; Technical University of Berlin; University of Vienna; Tilburg University; Technical University of Berlin; University of Vienna; Tilburg University
摘要：We conduct a series of Cournot duopoly market experiments with a high number of repetitions and fixed matching. Our treatments include markets with (a) complete cost symmetry and complete information, (b) slight cost asymmetry and complete information, and (c) varying cost asymmetries and incomplete information. For the case of complete cost symmetry and complete information, our data confirm the well-known result that duopoly players achieve, on average, partial collusion. However, as soon as...
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作者：Piazza, Adriana; Torres-Martinez, Juan Pablo
作者单位：Universidad de Chile
摘要：We study coalitional stability in matching problems with externalities, including marriage markets, roommate problems, and Shapley-Scarf housing markets as particular cases. When preferences are randomly determined, the probability of having a coalitionally stable solution is positively affected by three factors: the prudence of coalitions when evaluating a deviation, the social connectedness of those that can react to it, and the incidence of externalities in preferences. At the same time, th...
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作者：Zhang, Peilu; Zhang, Yinjunjie; Palma, Marco A.
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah; Australian National University; Texas A&M University System; Texas A&M University College Station
摘要：Women frequently react less favorably to competition than men. In this paper, we investigate the effects of social roles on willingness to compete (WTC). Subjects compete in two-person teams. In the treatment, one team member is randomly assigned the role of breadwinner/manager, and the other person is randomly assigned as the supporter/assistant. The only difference between the roles is the labels. In the baseline, subjects compete without any role assignment. We find women's WTC increases by...
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作者：Heller, Yuval; Kuzmics, Christoph
作者单位：Bar Ilan University; University of Graz
摘要：An equilibrium is communication-proof if it is unaffected by new opportunities to communicate and renegotiate. We characterize the set of equilibria of coordination games with pre-play communication in which players have private preferences over the coordinated outcomes. The set of communication-proof equilibria is a small and relatively homogeneous subset of the set of qualitatively diverse Bayesian Nash equilibria. Under a communication-proof equilibrium, players never miscoordinate, play th...
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作者：Bhattacharya, Haimanti; Dugar, Subhasish
作者单位：Utah System of Higher Education; University of Utah
摘要：Evidence on the combined effects of threats and retaliations on bargainers' payoffs from actual marketplaces is scarce. We conduct a natural field experiment in a marketplace where buyers employ verbal threats to negotiate discounts, while sellers can covertly retaliate with fraudulent actions that may negatively affect buyers' payoffs. By varying the threat levels, we find that seller retaliations intensify as the threat level escalates, which more than offset any gains buyers make from negot...
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作者：Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Kasinger, Johannes; Schneider, Dmitrij
作者单位：University of Munster; Max Planck Society; Tilburg University; Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf
摘要：We test for skewness preferences in a large set of observational panel data on online poker games (n=4,450,585). Each observation refers to a choice between a safe option and a binary risk of winning or losing the game. Our setting offers a real-world choice situation with substantial incentives where probability distributions are simple, transparent, and known to the decision- makers. Individuals reveal a strong and robust preference for skewness, which is inconsistent with expected utility t...
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作者：Arieli, Itai; Arigapudi, Srinivas
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; Indian Institute of Technology System (IIT System); Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) - Kanpur
摘要：This paper investigates the dynamics of product adoption under incomplete information regarding the product quality. A new agent observes a small sample of product choices within the population and receives a noisy private signal regarding the realized state of the world. Using simple heuristics, the agent estimates both the product quality and the distribution of product choices in the population. The agent then chooses a product that is a best response to this estimate. We show that fast ado...
