Information disclosure in mitigating moral hazard: An experimental investigation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Du, Ninghua; Shahriar, Quazi
• 署名单位: Shanghai University of Finance & Economics; California State University System; San Diego State University
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.02.001
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 284-299
• 关键词: Information design; moral hazard; disclosure; experiment

摘要

In a moral hazard framework, an agent considers undertaking a task of uncertain difficulty. An immediate disclosure of the task's difficulty by the principal convinces the agent to perform only easy tasks. By contrast, information design theory predicts that delayed disclosure can induce the agent to continue working even when the work turns out to be challenging. Our experimental evidence confirms that delayed disclosure outperforms immediate disclosure and no disclosure, as theory predicts, but only if immediate disclosure is not available. However, when the principal is faced with the choice between the two policies and chooses delayed disclosure over immediate disclosure, the superiority of delayed disclosure disappears due to the agent's intention -based reciprocity towards the principal.