-
作者：Abizadeh, Arash; Vetta, Adrian
作者单位：McGill University; McGill University; McGill University
摘要：The classical measures of voting power are based on players' decisiveness or full causal efficacy in vote configurations or divisions. We design an alternative, recursive measure departing from this classical approach. We motivate the measure via an axiomatic characterisation based on reasonable axioms and by offering two complementary interpretations of its meaning: first, we interpret the measure to represent, not the player's probability of being decisive in a voting structure, but its expe...
-
作者：Ishida, Junichiro; Suen, Wing
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Hong Kong
摘要：We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their signaling actions according to an exogenous distribution. These behavioral agents provide opportunities for strategic low-type agents to successfully emulate higher types in equilibrium, which in turn reduces the cost for strategic high-type agents to separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The mod...
-
作者：Hanaki, Nobuyuki; Kayaba, Yutaka; Maekawa, Jun; Matsushima, Hitoshi
作者单位：University of Osaka; University of Tokyo
摘要：We examine the impact of a cycle path on the trading of a copyable information good in a network experimentally. A cycle path in a network allows a buyer to become a reseller who can compete against existing sellers by replicating the good. A theoretical prediction considers that the price of the information good, even with the first transaction where there is not yet a reseller competing with the original seller, will be lower in networks with a cycle path than otherwise. However, our experim...
-
作者：Agarwal, Anish; Dahleh, Munther; Horel, Thibaut; Rui, Maryann
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externalities firms face when data, though inherently freely replicable, is allocated to competing firms. In this setting, we demonstrate that a data seller's optimal revenue increases as firms can pay to prevent allocations to others. To do so, we first reduce the combinatorial problem of allocating and pricing multiple data...
-
作者：Herings, P. Jean-Jacques; Zhou, Yu
作者单位：Tilburg University; Nagoya University
摘要：We consider a one-to-one matching with contracts model in the presence of liquidity constraints on the buyer's side. Liquidity constraints can be either soft or hard. Competitive equilibria do exist in economies with soft liquidity constraints, but not necessarily in the presence of hard liquidity constraints. The limit of a convergent sequence of competitive equilibria in economies with increasingly stringent soft liquidity constraints may fail to be a competitive equilibrium in the limit eco...
-
作者：Diekert, Florian; Eymess, Tillmann
作者单位：University of Augsburg; University of Augsburg; Ruprecht Karls University Heidelberg
摘要：Nudges are widely used and a broad literature documents that they successfully affect individual behavior. However, in most settings where nudges are needed to change collective action, teams - not individuals - determine outcomes. Because team decision making is pervasive, learning whether nudges work with teams in social dilemmas is important, especially when formal enforcement is difficult. Here, we show that a nudge increases team cooperation by 14 to 16 percentage points in a social dilem...
-
作者：Dharanan, G. V. A.; Ellis, Alex
作者单位：University of New South Wales Sydney
摘要：We consider first-price auctions with independent and private valuations that have asymmetric valuation distributions and supports. We first show the existence of equilibrium in these auctions through a perturbation approach, thereby establishing that the limit of Bayesian Nash equilibria (BNE) of such perturbed auctions is indeed the Bayesian Nash equilibrium (BNE) of the limit auction with asymmetric supports. We then characterize this BNE and show that the e-equilibrium (e-BNE) of the aucti...
-
作者：Blazquiz-Pulido, Juan Francisco; Polonio, Luca; Bilancini, Ennio
作者单位：IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca; Universitat d'Alacant; University of Milano-Bicocca
摘要：Recognizing people's deceptive intentions when communicating is crucial to detect statements that may drive us to unintended harmful decisions. This paper studies individuals' intentions in games where players can tell the truth with deceiving purposes. In a preregistered experiment, we combine a sender-receiver game with possible strategic considerations and the associated belief elicitation questionnaire, with a sender-receiver game with no room for strategic considerations. We propose a new...
-
作者：Puppe, Clemens; Slinko, Arkadii
作者单位：Helmholtz Association; Karlsruhe Institute of Technology; University of Auckland
摘要：Condorcet domains are sets of preference orders such that the majority relation corresponding to any profile of preferences from the domain is acyclic. The best known examples in economics are the single -peaked, the single -crossing, and the group separable domains. We survey the latest developments in the area since Monjardet's magisterial overview (2009), provide some new results and offer two conjectures concerning unsolved problems. The main goal of the presentation is to illuminate the r...
