Integrating Raiffa and Nash approaches to bargaining using interim agreements

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Chatterjee, Kalyan; Chaturvedi, Rakesh
• 署名单位: Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2024.05.003
• 发表日期: 2024
• 页码: 105-120
• 关键词: Bargaining; Nash bargaining solution; Raiffa's bargaining solution; Negotiation curve

摘要

Raiffa's solution to the bargaining problem, outlined in Luce and Raiffa (1957), is the point where the negotiation curve - a sequence of points that constitute step-by-step improvements from the status quo in the feasible payoff space - meets (possibly in the limit) the efficient boundary of the feasible region. A bargaining model with interim agreements yields a negotiation curve in equilibrium (in the spirit of Raiffa), and as the bargaining frictions disappear, the Raiffa path of payoffs converges to the Nash solution.