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作者：Charness, Gary; Di Bartolomeo, Giovanni; Papa, Stefano
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Santa Barbara; Sapienza University Rome; University of Antwerp; University of Rome Tor Vergata
摘要：One's social identity tends to favor those belonging to one's group. At the same time, communication has had beneficial social consequences in controlled laboratory experiments. Can communication improve trust and outcomes between out-group members by making them more familiar? We construct a simple weak mechanism of group favoritism (different assigned colors) that induces in-group favoritism. Communication increases cooperation but does not affect per se the social identity gap, i.e., people...
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作者：Jeong, Seungwon (Eugene); Lee, Joosung
作者单位：Korea Advanced Institute of Science & Technology (KAIST)
摘要：We introduce the groupwise-pivotal referral (GPR) mechanism for auctions where buyers can participate through referrals. Each buyer's type consists of a valuation and referable buyers. Unlike the second-price auction (SPA), the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism provides referral incentives. However, VCG is not budget-feasible. In contrast, under complete information, GPR is core-selecting, implying efficiency and budget feasibility. Under incomplete information, bidders refer truthfully an...
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作者：Bo, Inacio; Chen, Li; Hakimov, Rustamdjan
作者单位：University of Macau; Tongji University; University of Gothenburg; University of Lausanne
摘要：We consider situations in which consumers are aware that a statistical model determines the price of a product based on their observed behavior. Using a novel experiment varying the context similarity between participant data and a product, we find that participants manipulate their responses to a survey regarding personal characteristics, and manipulation is more successful when the contexts are similar. Moreover, participants demand less privacy, and make less optimal privacy choices when th...
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作者：de Barreda, Ines Moreno
作者单位：University of Oxford
摘要：This paper studies how the transmission of information from a biased expert to a decision maker is affected when the latter has access to an unbiased symmetric private signal. The extra information has two distinct effects on the expert's incentives to communicate. First, there is an information effect that allows the decision maker to choose a better action on expectation. This reduces the implicit cost of transmitting coarse messages and hence hampers communication. Second, there is a risk e...
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作者：Jagau, Stephan
作者单位：University of Nottingham; University of California System; University of California Irvine; Maastricht University
摘要：Five decades after Harsanyi and Selten's seminal work on equilibrium selection, we remain unable to predict the outcomes of real-life coordination even in simple cases. One reason is that experiments have struggled to quantify the effects of payoff- and risk-dominance and to separate them from context factors like feedback, repetition, and complexity. This experiment is the first to demonstrate that both payoff- and risk-dominance significantly and independently impact coordination decision-ma...
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作者：Dong, Lu; Huang, Lingbo; Lien, Jaimie W.; Zheng, Jie
作者单位：Southern University of Science & Technology; Shandong University
摘要：In a social network in which friendly and rival bilateral links can be formed, how do alliances between decision-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields the greatest social welfare, while a successful bullying attack transfers the victimized player's resources evenly to the attackers at ...
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作者：Feng, Di; Klaus, Bettina; Klijn, Flip
作者单位：Dongbei University of Finance & Economics; University of Lausanne; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Autonomous University of Barcelona
摘要：We consider the generalization of the classical Shapley and Scarf housing market model (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) to so-called multiple -type housing markets (Moulin, 1995). Throughout the paper, we focus on strict preferences. When preferences are separable, the prominent solution for these markets is the typewise top -trading -cycles (tTTC) mechanism. We first show that for lexicographic preferences, a mechanism is unanimous (or onto), individually rational, strategy -proof, and non -bossy if...
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作者：Kasajima, Yoichi; Toda, Manabu
作者单位：Waseda University
摘要：We propose a new axiom called own-side singles monotonicity in one-to-one matching problems between men and women. Suppose that there is an agent who is not matched in a problem. Suppose for simplicity it is a woman. Now in a new problem, we improve (or leave unchanged) her ranking for each man. Own-side singles monotonicity requires that each woman should not be made better off (except for her). If we focus on improving the ranking of an unmatched woman, then the men-optimal stable solution s...
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作者：Brownback, Andy; Burke, Nathaniel; Gagnon-Bartsch, Tristan
作者单位：University of Arkansas System; University of Arkansas Fayetteville; West Virginia University; University of Iowa
摘要：People often attempt to present a positive image by overstating virtuous behaviors when responding to unincentivized polls. We examine whether others account for this socially desirable responding (SDR) when drawing inferences from such unincentivized responses. In an experiment, we incentivize predictors to guess others' choice behaviors across actions with varying social desirability. Predictors observe random subsamples of either (i) incentivized choices or (ii) hypothetical claims. The hyp...
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作者：Gneezy, Uri; Rottenstreich, Yuval
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Are people skillful in utilizing potential focal points? We find a class of situations for which the answer is negative: the presence of prominent actions appears to stymie the use of distinct actions for coordination. Across several experimental games, we consistently observe that players readily coordinate on a categorically distinct action when all available actions are non-prominent but not when some actions are prominent. For instance, given the action set {Franklin Pierce, James Buchanan...
