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作者：Galanis, Spyros
作者单位：Durham University
摘要：No trade theorems examine conditions under which agents cannot agree to disagree on the value of a security which pays according to some state of nature, thus preventing any mutual agreement to trade. A large literature has examined conditions which imply no trade, such as relaxing the common prior and common knowledge assumptions, as well as allowing for agents who are boundedly rational or ambiguity averse. We contribute to this literature by examining conditions on the private information o...
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作者：Shakhgildyan, Ksenia
作者单位：Bocconi University; Bocconi University
摘要：In this paper, I establish the identification and present a nonparametric estimator for the incomplete information generalized second-price auction model. I recover the distribution of the bidders' quality-adjusted valuations from the CDF of the adjusted bids, win outcomes, and click- through rates. Through the Monte Carlo simulations, I evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed estimator. Additionally, I compare the estimator of the incomplete information model to the estimator o...
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作者：Barokas, Guy; Nitzan, Shmuel
作者单位：Ruppin Academic Center; Bar Ilan University
摘要：In his refined characterization of the Borda rule, Maskin (2025; forthcoming in the Journal of Political Economy) significantly employs the assumption of a continuum of voters. He concludes by posing an important open question about the possible extension of the characterization result to the case of finitely many voters. This note provides a positive response to this question, based on a novel axiom that conveys the normative appeal of continuity when applied to a discrete setting, namely, th...
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作者：Osun, Elif B.; Ozbay, Erkut Y.
作者单位：University of Maryland College Park; University System of Maryland; University of Maryland College Park
摘要：The voluntary disclosure literature suggests that in evidence games, where the informed sender chooses which pieces of evidence to disclose to the uninformed receiver who determines their payoff, commitment does not matter, as there is a theoretical equivalence between the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes. In this paper, we experimentally investigate whether the optimal mechanism and the game equilibrium outcomes coincide in a simple evidence game. Contrary to the theoretica...
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作者：Gorelkina, Olga; Laraki, Rida; Reynouard, Maxime
摘要：This paper presents a novel solution concept, called BAR Nash Equilibrium (BARNE) and applies it to the Verifier's Dilemma, a fundamental problem in the design of blockchain consensus. BARNE extends the Nash Equilibrium (NE) to accommodate interactions among Byzantine, altruistic, and rational agents, known as the BAR setting in the distributed computing literature. We prove the existence of BARNE in a broad class of games and introduce two refinements: global stability and local stability. We...
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作者：Benndorf, Volker; Kubler, Dorothea; Normann, Hans-Theo
作者单位：Heinrich Heine University Dusseldorf; Technical University of Berlin
摘要：Information unraveling is an elegant theoretical argument suggesting that private information is voluntarily and fully revealed in many circumstances. However, the experimental literature has documented many cases of incomplete unraveling and has suggested limited depth of reasoning on the part of senders as a behavioral explanation. To test this explanation, we modify the design of existing unraveling games along two dimensions. In contrast to the baseline setting with simultaneous moves, we ...
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作者：Maxey, Tyler
作者单位：Princeton University
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作者：Bauer, Kevin; Kosfeld, Michael; von Siemens, Ferdinand A.
作者单位：Goethe University Frankfurt
摘要：We study, theoretically and empirically, the effect of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce social goods in the presence of positive effort complementarities. Theory predicts that lowering incentives increases social-good production via the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents into low-incentive work environments. We test this prediction in a novel lab experiment that allows us to isolate the effect of self-selection cleanly. Results s...
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作者：Athanasoglou, Stergios; Bonkoungou, Somouaoga; Ehlers, Lars
作者单位：University of Milano-Bicocca; University of Lausanne; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：Consider a setting in which individual strict preferences need to be aggregated into a social strict preference relation. For two alternatives and an odd number of agents, it follows from May's Theorem that the majority aggregation rule is the only one satisfying anonymity, neutrality and strategy-proofness (SP). For more than two alternatives, anonymity and neutrality are incompatible for many problem instances and we explore this tradeoff for strategy-proof rules. The notion of SP that we em...
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作者：Chen, Haoning; Dong, Miaomiao; Henry, Marc; Sidorov, Ivan
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We propose a model of labor market sector self-selection that combines comparative advantage, as in the Roy model, and sector composition preference. Two groups choose between two sectors based on heterogeneous potential incomes and group compositions in each sector. Potential incomes incorporate group specific human capital accumulation and wage discrimination. Composition preferences are interpreted as reflecting group specific amenity preferences as well as homophily and aversion to minorit...
