Proxy variables and feedback effects in decision making

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Clyde, Alexander
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0899-8256
• DOI: 10.1016/j.geb.2025.07.008
• 发表日期: 2025
• 关键词: MISSPECIFIED MODELS; selection bias; equilibrium; games

摘要

When using data, an analyst often only has access to proxies of the true variables. I propose a framework that models decision makers who naively assume potentially noisy proxy variables are perfect measurements. Due to feedback from choices into data, a notion of equilibrium is required to close the model. I illustrate the concept with applications to policing/crime and market entry. In these applications, we see that very small imperfections in the proxy variable can lead to large distortions in beliefs. I show that the set of strategies that can arise as equilibria with arbitrarily close to perfect measurement coincides with a version of Self-Confirming Equilibrium.