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作者：Chen, Haoning; Dong, Miaomiao; Henry, Marc; Sidorov, Ivan
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
摘要：We propose a model of labor market sector self-selection that combines comparative advantage, as in the Roy model, and sector composition preference. Two groups choose between two sectors based on heterogeneous potential incomes and group compositions in each sector. Potential incomes incorporate group specific human capital accumulation and wage discrimination. Composition preferences are interpreted as reflecting group specific amenity preferences as well as homophily and aversion to minorit...
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作者：van Damme, Eric; Lang, Xu
作者单位：Tilburg University; Shandong University
摘要：We consider two-person bargaining problems in which (only) the disagreement payoffs are private information and it is common knowledge that disagreement is inefficient. We show that, in the NTU-case, if the Pareto frontier is linear, the players' interim utilities of an ex post efficient mechanism cannot depend on the disagreement payoffs. If the frontier is non-linear, the result continues to hold when the conflict payoffs are independent, or one player has at most two types. In the TU-case, ...
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作者：Freer, Mikhail; Surana, Khushboo
作者单位：University of Essex; University of York - UK
摘要：We present a revealed preference characterization of marital stability where some couples are committed. A couple is committed if they can divorce only with mutual consent. We provide theoretical insights into the potential of the characterization for identifying intrahousehold consumption patterns. We demonstrate that without price variation for private goods among potential couples, intrahousehold resource allocations can only be identified for non-committed couples. We conduct simulations u...
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作者：Aziz, Haris; Lederer, Patrick; Lu, Xinhang; Suzuki, Mashbat; Vollen, Jeremy
摘要：In approval-based budget division, a budget needs to be distributed to some candidates based on the voters' approval ballots over these candidates. In the pursuit of a simple, consistent, and approximately fair rule for this setting, we introduce the maximum payment rule (MP). Under this rule, each voter controls a part of the budget and, in each step, the corresponding voters allocate their entire budget to the candidate approved by the largest number of voters with nonzero budget. We show th...
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作者：Wang, Han
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We study the design of contracts that incentivize a researcher to conduct a costly experiment, extending the work of Yoder (2022) from binary states to a general state space. The cost is information of the researcher. When the experiment is observable, we find the optimal contract and show that higher types choose more costly experiments, but not necessarily more Blackwell informative ones. When only the experiment result is observable, the principal can still the same optimal outcome if and o...
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作者：Bizzarri, Matteo; Panebianco, Fabrizio; Pin, Paolo
作者单位：University of Naples Federico II; Catholic University of the Sacred Heart; University of Siena; Bocconi University
摘要：We analyze the effect of homophily in the diffusion of a harmful state between two groups of agents that differ in immunization rates. Homophily has a very different impact on the steady state infection level (that is increasing in homophily when homophily is small, and decreasing when high), and on the cumulative number of infections generated by a deviation from the steady state (that, instead, is decreasing in homophily when homophily is small, and increasing when high). If immunization rat...
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作者：Degan, Arianna; Li, Yushen; Xie, Huan
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal; Jinan University; Concordia University - Canada; Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We conduct an experiment on a two-player infinitely repeated favor exchange game. In the stage game, each player decides whether to provide a favor to the other player. A favor generates a fixed benefit for the recipient and a cost for the provider, which can be either low or high. We study the situation where this cost is private information and it is efficient to provide a favor only when the cost is low. We address two general questions: 1) To what extent do subjects exchange favors in ways...
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作者：Avalos-Trujillo, Luis
摘要：Upstream reciprocity, known colloquially as pay-it-forward, is reciprocating an act of kindness to an unrelated third party. Negative upstream reciprocity means reciprocating an unkind act to an unrelated third party. The present research proposes an experimental test of upstream reciprocity and contrast between its two forms. Survey questions on trust and gratitude complement the study. Results show evidence of positive upstream reciprocity but against its negative counterpart. Subjects pay f...
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作者：Duggan, John; Forand, Jean Guillaume
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Waterloo
摘要：We study electoral accountability in a dynamic environment with complete information. As our normative benchmark, we take the solution of the dynamic programming problem facing the representative voter as if he chose policy directly. There always exist equilibria in which the congruent politician type, whose policy preferences match those of the voter, is accountable, in the sense that these politicians achieve the idealized benchmark. We demonstrate that challenges to electoral accountability...
