Communication in repeated games with private monitoring
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
BenPorath, E; Kahneman, M
署名单位：
Tel Aviv University
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0090
发表日期：
1996
页码：
281-297
关键词：
摘要：
The paper considers repeated games where each player can be observed by only a subset of the other players, and where players can make public announcements about the behavior of the players they observed. We address the following question: What is the minimal level of observability that is required to obtain efficient outcomes? The main result is that the limit set of sequential equilibrium payoffs, when the discount factor tends to one, contains the set of individual rational payoffs whenever each player is observed by at least two other players. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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