On the existence of optimal contract mechanisms for incomplete information principal-agent models
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Balder, EJ
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0007
发表日期：
1996
页码：
133-148
关键词：
摘要：
Two abstract results are given for the existence of optimal contract selection mechanisms in principal-agent models; by a suitable reformulation of the (almost) incentive compatibility constraint, they deal with both single- and multi-agent models. In particular, it is shown that the existence results in a series of papers by F. H. Page follow from these two results. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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