Egalitarianism and incentives
成果类型：
Article
署名作者：
Ray, D; Ueda, K
署名单位：
Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
刊物名称：
JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
ISSN/ISSBN：
0022-0531
DOI：
10.1006/jeth.1996.0124
发表日期：
1996
页码：
324-348
关键词：
摘要：
A group of agents is collectively engaged in a joint productive activity. Each agent supplies an observable input, and output is then collectively shared among the members. A Bergson-Samuelson welfare function defined on individual utilities describes the social values of the agents. However, individual actions are taken on a selfish basis. The collective decision cannot be precommitted, and is made (after inputs are chosen) to maximize welfare conditional on the input decisions. This leads to inefficiency. The aim of this paper is to show formally that, contrary to popular belief the degree of inefficiency decreases in the extent of egalitarianism embodied in the social welfare function. (C) 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
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