On the role of commitment in a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Jost, PJ
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.1996.0028
• 发表日期: 1996
• 页码: 510-530

摘要

In many circumstances, a principal who has private information when contracting with an agent may perform some further action simultaneously with (or after) the agent's choice of an action. We analyze such a principal-agent relationship with an informed principal as a noncooperative game and distinguish two extensive-form games. First, the principal can commit to his subsequent action at the time of contracting. Second, the principal's announcement for his action is not binding at the time of performance. We show that commitment by the principal leads to separation and no commitment leads to pooling. (C) 1996 Academic Press. Inc.