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作者：Govindan, S; Robson, AJ
摘要：Gul and Pearce argue that forward induction has much less power as an equilibrium refinement than is generally supposed. The present comment raises the issue: What does admissibility imply for Gul and Pearce's analysis? In a key example, the precise equilibrium constructed by Gul and Pearce depends on a strategy which is not admissible. Even if ali equilibria are considered, it is not possible to preserve the Gul and Pearce results under admissibility. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Robles, J
作者单位：University of Colorado System; University of Colorado Boulder
摘要：This article considers the robustness of long run equilibria when mutation rates are not assumed to be constant over time. Particular attention is paid to the case where mutation rates decline to zero in the limit. It is Found that if behavior is ergodic, then it corresponds to the long run equilibrium for the game. However, conditions for ergodicity become increasingly restrictive as population size increases. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Fishman, A; Rob, R
作者单位：University of Haifa; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper examines the effect of competition on firms' efforts to experiment and learn about market demand. Consumers are assumed to know prices only at sellers they have actually visited, but must bear search costs to Find the prices of other sellers. Under these conditions we show that firms' incentives to experiment are diluted by comparison with the monopoly case and that this effect is stronger the smaller the search cost. The learning environment we portray gives rise to several time pa...
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作者：Guo, JT; Lansing, KJ
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Riverside; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - San Francisco; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Cleveland
摘要：It has been shown that a one-sector real business cycle model with sufficient increasing returns in production may possess an indeterminate steady state that can be exploited to generate business cycles driven by animal spirits of agents. This paper shows how an income tax schedule that exhibits a progressivity Feature can ensure saddle path stability in such a framework and thereby stabilize the economy against sunspot fluctuations. Conversely, an economy with a flat or regressive tax schedul...
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作者：Kalai, E; Ledyard, JO
作者单位：Northwestern University; California Institute of Technology
摘要：In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation folk theorem for patient implementers, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable. journal c...
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作者：Wallace, N
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park
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作者：Grant, S; Kajii, A; Polak, B
作者单位：Australian National University; University of Tsukuba; Yale University
摘要：Suppose agents value information not only to make contingent plans but also intrinsically. Wow are such attitudes toward information related to attitudes toward risk? We generalize the Kreps-Porteus recursive expected utility model, dropping both recursivity and expected utility. There is a geometric analogy between risk and information. We characterize intrinsic information loving, in general, by a substitution property analogous to multivariate risk loving; and, for smooth preferences, by th...
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作者：Ma, JP
作者单位：Rutgers University System; Rutgers University New Brunswick; Rutgers University Camden
摘要：This paper studies an exchange economy with a finite number of agents in which each agents is initially endowed with a finite number of (personalized) indivisible commodities. We observe that the equivalence theorem of the core and the competitive equilibrium may not hold for this economy when the coalitional form game is generated in the standard manner. We provide an alternative definition of the coalitional form game to resolve this problem so that the balancedness of the new defined game p...
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作者：Bottazzi, JM; Hens, T; Loffler, A
作者单位：heSam Universite; Universite Pantheon-Sorbonne; University of Bielefeld; Free University of Berlin
摘要：We demonstrate that in a CAPM economy Homogeneity, Walras' Law, and the Tobin Separation Property characterize market demand on finite sets of prices. Consequently, for any number n there exist CAPM economies which have at least n equilibria and hence have n different beta pricing formulas. Endowment perturbations in these economies cannot decrease the number of equilibria below n. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Campbell, CM
作者单位：University System of Ohio; Ohio State University
摘要：We examine self-enforcing bidder coordination in auctions in which bidding is costly. Conditions on the distribution of valuations are identified that guarantee multiple equilibria. Under slightly stronger conditions, within the set of sunspot payoffs only those that are convex combinations of payoffs of extreme asymmetric equilibria are interim efficient for the bidders. If preplay communication is possible, every no-communication equilibrium payoff is interim Pareto-dominated for the bidders...
