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作者：Green, EJ; Zhou, RL
作者单位：Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We consider a version of Kiyotaki and Wright's monetary search model in which agents can hold arbitrary amounts of divisible money. A continuum of stationary equilibria, indexed by the aggregate real money stock, exists with all trading occurring at a single price. There is always a maximum level of the real money stock consistent with existence of such an equilibrium. In the limit as trading becomes faster relative to discounting, any real money stock becomes feasible in such an equilibrium. ...
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作者：Acemoglu, D
作者单位：Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT)
摘要：This paper offers a model of credit markets with adverse selection and moral hazard. The equilibrium is highly inefficient, and the underlying reason is the zero-profit condition imposed by competing financial intermediaries which gives very high powered incentives to entrepreneurs. The paper demonstrates that when entrepreneurs can hire a manager to run their projects, the inefficiencies are prevented. This is because the manager is not the residual claimant of the returns, and hence has low ...
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作者：Baliga, S; Sjöström, T
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University
摘要：We consider a model where agents work in sequence on a project, share information not available to the principal, and can collude. Due to limited liability the Cease theorem does not apply. The distribution of surplus among the agents is therefore an important control variable for the principal, which gives us a theory of how to delegate in an organization subject to moral hazard. The optimal distribution of surplus can always be achieved by delegating in the right way (decentralization) witho...
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作者：Kaas, L
作者单位：University of Bielefeld
摘要：In an overlapping generations model with Cournot competition on the goods market it is shown that a continuum of stationary states and perfect foresight trajectories exists with unemployment at arbitrary low wages. Decisive for this is the influence that different forecast functions have on the objective demand curve, even though they are consistent with perfect foresight. With an example it is shown that simple adaptive and constant memory forecast rules generate such unemployment equilibria....
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作者：Muller, HM
作者单位：University of Mannheim
摘要：The continuous-time principal-agent model with exponential utility developed by Holmstrom and Milgrom admits a simple closed-form solution: The second-best sharing rule is a linear function of aggregated output. Here. we show that the first-best sharing rule is also linear in aggregated output. The result follows immediately from the separability of the problem and the fact that principal and agent both have CARA utility. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Bergin, J; Sen, A
作者单位：Queens University - Canada; Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi
摘要：We study the implementation of social choice rules in incomplete information environments. A sufficiency condition called posterior reversal is given for extensive form implementation. The condition has a natural interpretation in signaling terms: Consistent posterior distributions under truth-telling are different from consistent posteriors under deception. This variation in the distribution over player types leads to variation in the distribution over actions and outcomes (comparing truth-te...
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作者：Phelan, C
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：This paper analyzes the effects of moral hazard on long-run consumption or utility. Given exponential utility, it is shown that the utility of those with unobservable endowments becomes arbitrarily negative as long as any positive fraction of otherwise identical agents have observable endowments. Next, it is shown that assuming a finite number of agents results in essentially the same outcomes as with a continuum of agents. Finally, it is shown that the key characteristic determining whether t...
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作者：Crawford, V
作者单位：University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：This paper is a survey of experimental evidence on behavior in ames with communication focusing on environments where talk is cheap in the sense that players' messages have no direct payoff implications. Also considered are some environments in which communication was permitted throughout the game, in addition to those environments in which only preplay communication was allowed. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Kim, SK; Wang, SS
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper studies the characteristics of optimal contracts when the agent is risk-averse in the double moral-hazard situation in which the principal also participates in the production process. It is already known that a simple linear contract is one of many optimal contracts under the double moral-hazard when the agent is risk-neutral. We find that the agent's optimal incentive scheme in this case is unique and non-linear, but less sensitive to output than would be designed under a single mo...
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作者：Cressman, R; Schlag, KH
作者单位：Wilfrid Laurier University; University of Bonn
摘要：The evolutionary basis for predicting the backwards induction solution in finite extensive-form games with perfect information is examined. Evolution is modelled using the replicator dynamic in combination with rare perturbations that introduce a small change in the proportion of each strategy. The criterion for our judgement is whether this dynamic stabilizes over time at the subgame perfect equilibrium outcome. We find that the backwards induction solution is fully justified by this process ...
