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作者：Chari, VV; Christiano, LJ; Eichelbaum, M
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Minneapolis; Northwestern University; Federal Reserve System - USA; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We develop a dynamic model with optimizing private agents and a benevolent, optimizing monetary authority that cannot commit to future policies. We characterize the set of sustainable equilibria and discuss the implications for institutional reform. We show that there are equilibria in which the monetary authority pursues inflationary policies because that is what private agents expect. We call such equilibria expectation traps. Alternative institutional arrangements for the conduct of monetar...
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作者：Konishi, H; Le Breton, M; Weber, S
作者单位：Southern Methodist University; Institut Universitaire de France
摘要：This paper examines the existence of a noncooperative equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy where consumers have quasi-linear preferences. Jurisdictions consist of consumers who chose the same public project and finance the cost of production of public goods through either a proportional income tax or a poll tax. We show that under a proportional income tax scheme a Nash equilibria may fail to exist. Under a poll tax scheme an equilibrium always exists but, in general. Nash equili...
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作者：Brusco, S
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：In auctions with correlated types it is possible to design mechanisms such that full surplus extraction can be obtained as the outcome of an equilibrium in which agents use (weakly) dominant strategies. However, it is not assured that the outcome is unique. We present an example in which no mechanism can yield the Full surplus extraction outcome as the unique Bayesian equilibrium outcome. Next we show that in the standard auction model the multiplicity problem can be fully resolved using seque...
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作者：Shi, SY
作者单位：Queens University - Canada
摘要：This paper examines a monetary propagation mechanism in an economy where exchanges in goods and labor markets involve costly search. It is shown that an increase in the money growth rate increases steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is low but reduces steady state employment and output when the money growth rate is already high. The model produces persistent, hump-shaped responses in employment and output to money growth shocks even when the shocks have no persistence...
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作者：Hong, L
作者单位：Syracuse University; Northwestern University
摘要：This paper considers Feasible Bayesian implementation for an environment with state dependent feasible sets. We assume no externality in individual feasibility constraint sets and no exaggeration on the part of agents, but allow for flexible information structures. Bayesian Incentive Compatibility, Closure, and Bayesian Monotonicity are found to be necessary and sufficient for Feasible Bayesian implementation. This result is applied to an exchange economy where agents have fixed preferences bu...
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作者：Glazer, J; Rubinstein, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University; Princeton University
摘要：A number of experts receive noisy signals regarding a desirable public decision. The public target is to make the best possible decision on thr basis of all the information held by the experts. We compare two cultures. Tn one, all experts are driven only by the public motive to increase the probability that the desirable action will be taken. In the second, each expert is also driven by a private motive: to have his recommendation accepted. We show that in the First culture, every mechanism wi...
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作者：Serrano, R; Shimomura, K
作者单位：Brown University; University of Osaka
摘要：We extend Nash's bargaining theory to non-convex and coalitional problems. This paper investigates the implications of Nash-like axioms for bilateral problems and the properties of consistency and converse consistency over multilateral settings. The result is a characterization of the Nash set of NTU games, defined as the solution concept where each pair of players is splitting the gains from trade at a point where the Nash product of their utilities, subject to efficiency, is critical. The in...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This paper studies a model of a two-armed bandit played in parallel by two or more players. Players observe the actions of all other players, but not the outcome of their experiments. It is shown that if the parameters of the two arms (i.e., their success probabilities) are different by a fixed margin, all players eventually settle on the same arm with probability one in any Nash equilibrium of the game. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Bhattacharya, J; Guzman, MG; Shell, K
作者单位：Cornell University; State University of New York (SUNY) System; University at Buffalo, SUNY; Wellesley College
摘要：We investigate sunspot equilibria in a static, one-commodity model with taxes and transfers denominated in money units. Volatility in this economy is purely monetary, since the only uncertainty is about the price level. We construct simple, robust examples of sunspot equilibria that are not mere randomizations over certainty equilibria. We also identify the source of these SSEs: Equilibrium in the securities market is determined as if there were no restricted consumers and the unrestricted con...
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作者：Heifetz, A
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：In their seminal paper, Mertens and Zamir (Int. Game Theory 14 (1985), 1-29) proved the existence of a universal Harsanyi type space which consists of all possible types. Their method of proof depends crucially on topological assumptions. Whether such assumptions are essential to the existence of a universal space remained an open problem. Here we prove that a universal type space does exist even when spaces an defined in pure measure theoretic terms. Heifetz and Samet (mimeo, Tel Aviv Univers...
