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作者：Dutta, J; Michel, P
作者单位：University of Cambridge; Aix-Marseille Universite
摘要：In this paper, we study the distribution of wealth in an economy with infinitely lived families. Individual generations of each family may or may not be altruistic. This is represented as a preference shock which follows a first-order Markov process within each Family, a feature representing imperfect altruism. Altruistic individuals care about the welfare of their children and are likely to leave bequests; selfish ones do not. This results in a non-trivial distribution of wealth among familie...
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作者：Tourky, R
作者单位：La Trobe University
摘要：Aliprantis, Brown, and Burkinshaw (Econometrica 55 (1987), 1109-1137) proved that Edgeworth equilibria for exchange economies in topological vector lattices are pseudo-equilibria. In this paper we extend their result to more general spaces. We consider pure trade economies in a vector lattice commodity space with a lattice ordered price space. By adapting the techniques of Mas-Colell and Richard (J. Econ. Theory 53 (1991), 1-11) we obtain the required decentralizing continuous price as the sup...
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作者：Banks, JS; Sundaram, RK
作者单位：California Institute of Technology; New York University
摘要：This paper studies the interaction between a single long-lived principal and a series of short-lived agents in the presence of both moral hazard and adverse selection. We assume that the principal can influence the agents' behavior only through her choice of a retention rule; this rule is Further required to be sequentially rational (i.e., no precommitment is allowed). We provide general conditions under which equilibria exist where (a) the principal adopts a cut-off rule under which agents ar...
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作者：Huybens, E; Smith, BD
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; University of Texas System; University of Texas Austin
摘要：We consider a small open economy with a costly state verification problem and binding reserve requirements. The presence of these frictions leads to the existence of two steady states with credit rationing. An increase in the money growth rate, the world interest rate or reserve requirements raises (lowers) GDP in the high (low) activity steady state. However, sufficiently large increases in money growth or the world interest rate can transform the high activity steady state from a sink to a s...
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作者：Karandikar, R; Mookherjee, D; Ray, D; Vega-Redondo, F
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Delhi; Boston University; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); Universitat d'Alacant; Universitat d'Alacant
摘要：A 2 x 2 game is played repeatedly by two satisficing players. The game considered includes the Prisoner's Dilemma, as well as games of coordination and common interest. Each player has an aspiration at each date, and takes an action. The action is switched at the subsequent period only if the achieved payoff falls below aspirations; the switching probability depends on the shortfall. Aspirations are periodically updated according to payoff experience: but are occasionally subject to trembles. ...
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作者：Alcalde, J; Perez-Castrillo, D; Romero-Medina, A
作者单位：Universitat d'Alacant; Autonomous University of Barcelona; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We implement the stable correspondence of a job matching market in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium. We use a simple sequential mechanism in which firms propose a salary to each worker (first stage) and, then, each worker accepts at most one proposal (second stage). Moreover, if agents preferences are additive, this mechanism implements in Subgame Perfect Equilibrium the firms' optimal correspondence when firms use undominated strategies. Finally, we construct another simple sequential mechanism wh...
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作者：Binmore, K; Piccione, M; Samuelson, L
作者单位：University of London; University College London; University of Southampton; University of Wisconsin System; University of Wisconsin Madison
摘要：This paper characterizes modified evolutionarily stable strategies (MESSES) in Rubinstein's alternating-offers, infinite-horizon bargaining game. We show that a MESS causes agreement to be achieved immediately, with neither player willing to delay the agreement by one period in order to achieve the other player's share of the surplus. Each player's share of the surplus is then bounded between the shares received by the two players in the unique subgame-perfect equilibrium of Rubinstein's game....
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作者：Donaldson, D; Weymark, JA
作者单位：University of British Columbia
摘要：We show that any quasiordering is the intersection of orderings. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Li, YT; Wright, R
作者单位：National Tsing Hua University; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：We study government transaction policies in search-theoretic models of money. We model government as a subset of agents, who are subject to the same random matching technology and other constraints as private agents, but who behave in an exogenous way regarding which objects they accept in trade and at what price. The objective is to see how these policies affect private agents' strategics, and hence the set of equilibria. We analyze how the effects depend on factors like the size of governmen...
