-
作者：Coles, MG; Wright, R
作者单位：University of Essex; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE); University of Pennsylvania
摘要：This paper considers dynamic equilibria in a model with random matching. strategic bargaining, and money. Equilibrium in the bargaining game is characterized in terms of a simple differential equation. When we embed this characterization into the monetary economy, the model can generate outcomes such as limit cycles that never arise if one imposes a myopic Nash bargaining solution, as has been done in the past. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
-
作者：Edlin, AS; Shannon, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：Economists commonly seek to show that one variable increases in response to changes in another variable. This paper provides sufficient conditions to draw such strict monotone comparative statics conclusions in optimization problems with and without binding constraints. These results extend the lattice-theoretic results of Milgrom and Shannon [10] by imposing a stronger differential version of the single crossing property and arguing from first-order conditions. We illustrate the importance of...
-
作者：Grandmont, JM; Pintus, P; de Vilder, R
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; CY Cergy Paris Universite; University of Amsterdam
摘要：We develop simple geometrical methods to study local indeterminacy, bifurcations, and stochastic (sunspot) equilibria near a steady state, in nonlinear two dimensional economic models. We present in particular a simple. constructive, geometrical characterization of the support of stochastic sunspot equilibria, not only arbitrarily near a steady state, but also along local bifurcations. These methods are applied to a simple aggregative model to study in particular the influence of capital-labor...
-
作者：Marschak, T; Reichelstein, S
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley
摘要：Our model of network mechanisms studies individually addressed messages between any two members of an organization. For a given organizational objective function, wt examine communication costs, as measured by the number of message variables that agents need to exchange at equilibrium in order to achieve the desired action choices. Fur the class of objective functions we consider. price mechanisms are shown to minimize communication costs. IT cine requires the network tu be hierarchical, the o...
-
作者：Ben-Porath, E
作者单位：Tel Aviv University
摘要：Let P be a correlated equilibrium distribution on the set of outcomes of a fame G. Can P be implemented by some cheap pre-play procedure that does not involve a mediator? It is shown that if there are two distinct Nash equilibrium payoffs for each player in G and if P is rational (that is, consists of probabilities which are rational numbers) and generates for each player i an expected payoff which is above her worst Nash equilibrium payoff, then P can be virtually implemented in a sequential ...
-
作者：Heifetz, A; Polemarchakis, HM
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：We exhibit a partially revealing rational expectations equilibrium, where no individual knows the state of the world or the quantities traded by any other individual. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
-
作者：Fiestras-Janeiro, G; Borm, P; van Megen, F
作者单位：Universidade de Vigo; Tilburg University; Tilburg University
摘要：This paper introduces the notions of protective and prudent equilibria in the context of finite games in strategic form. It turns out that for games both notions are in fact equivalent. Moreover, it is shown that for matrix games the set of protective equilibria equals the set of proper equilibria. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
-
作者：Kajii, A
作者单位：University of Tsukuba
摘要：This paper studies the regularity of competitive equilibria in a two period exchange economy with one asset where a sunspot signal is observed in the beginning of the second period. It is shown that an equilibrium which does not depend on sunspots is regular if and only if it is sequentially regular as an equilibrium of the economy without sunspots. Hence if the asset is real, a sequential regular equilibrium is robust against any sunspot structure, which may be endogenously generated. (C) 199...
-
作者：Wen, Y
作者单位：Hong Kong University of Science & Technology
摘要：This paper overcomes an important objection against the empirical relevance of the Benhabib-Farmer model as a potential account of actual business cycle fluctuations. This is attributable to an elasticity effect and a returns-to-scale effect of capacity utilization. These effects are closely related to the empirical puzzles that capital appears to play an insignificant role in explaining cyclical movements in output and that the estimated labor elasticity appears to be larger than labor's shar...
-
作者：Schlag, KH
作者单位：University of Bonn
摘要：Individuals in a finite population repeatedly choose among actions yielding uncertain payoffs. Between choices, each individual observes the action and realized outcome of one other individual. We restrict our search to learning rules with limited memory that increase expected payoffs regardless of the distribution underlying their realizations. It is shown that the rule that outperforms all others is that which imitates the action of an observed individual (whose realized outcome is better th...
