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作者：Hon-Snir, S; Monderer, D; Sela, A
作者单位：Technion Israel Institute of Technology; University of Mannheim
摘要：We analyze a repeated first-price auction in which the types of the players are determined before the first round. It is proved that if every player is using either a belief-based learning scheme with bounded recall or a generalized fictitious play learning scheme, then after sufficiently long time, the players' bids are in equilibrium in the one-shot auction in which the types are commonly known. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Kajii, A; Morris, S
作者单位：University of Tsukuba; University of Pennsylvania
摘要：An incomplete information game is defined by a probability distribution mu over a type space and payoff functions u. Probability distribution mu' is strategically close to mu if, for any bounded payoff functions u and any equilibrium of the game (mu, u), there exists an approximate equilibrium of the game (mu', u) under which all players get approximately the same payoffs. This note shows that two probability distributions are strategically close if and only if (1) they assign similar ex ante ...
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作者：Polemarchakis, HM; Siconolfi, P
作者单位：Universite Catholique Louvain; Columbia University
摘要：Competitive equilibrium allocations are indeterminate when the net trades in commodities are constrained, while the asset market is incomplete. The model encompasses economies with deferred payment for commodities, economies with nominal assets, and economies with bundling of commodities and assets. (C) 1998 Academic Press
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作者：Benhabib, J; Nishimura, K
作者单位：New York University; Kyoto University
摘要：We show that indeterminacy can easily arise in multisector models that have constant variable returns to scale and very small market imperfections. This is in sharp contrast to models that require increasing returns to generate indeterminacy and which have been criticized on the basis of recent empirical estimates indicating that returns to scale are roughly constant and that market imperfections are small. We also show that we can calibrate our constant returns model with sunspots, using stan...
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作者：Bhaskar, V
作者单位：University of Essex
摘要：We analyze an evolutionary model with noisy pre-play communication, where the message received can differ from the message sent without the sender being aware of this. Noise implies that an inefficient strategy cannot push unsent messages, allowing these messages to be used by a mutant in order to coordinate upon an efficient outcome. This ensures that any neutrally stable strategy is efficient. Since noise restricts drift, we also have existence of evolutionarily stable sets in a larger class...
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作者：Gossner, O
摘要：Correlated equilibria and communication equilibria are useful notions to understand the strategic effects of information and communication. Between these two models, a protocol generates information through communication. We define a secure protocol as a protocol from which no individual may have strategic incentives to deviate and characterize these protocols. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: 072. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Benhabib, J
作者单位：New York University
摘要：This introduction provides an overview of the three papers included in this symposium and highlights their contribution to the literature. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Sandroni, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：A stage game is played for many periods. Each player maximizes discounted expected payoffs, given updated beliefs about opponent's strategies. For the case of infinitely repeated games, Kalai and Lehrer [8, 9] show that, under absolute continuity, rational learning leads to Nash equilibrium. Absolute continuity, however, does not ensure convergence to approximate Nash equilibrium play in games of long (but finite) horizon. I show that asymptotic continuity is equivalent to absolute continuity ...
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作者：Cellini, R; Lambertini, L
作者单位：University of Bologna
摘要：We consider a dynamic model of differentiated oligopoly with capital accumulation. We prove that the model may converge to either a steady state replicating the optimum of the static problem, or a steady state driven by capital accumulation alone. In the latter case, the same steady state equilibrium is observed under both Cournot and Bertrand competition, as well as social planning. Journal of Economic Literature Classifications Numbers: C73, L13. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Keister, T
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico; Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico
摘要：This paper examines the impact monetary redistribution policies have on the amount of sunspot-induced volatility in an economy. A dynamic model of segmented asset markets is presented in which the tax-transfer policy determines, in a continuous way, the influence sunspots can have on the general price level and on consumption. If the policy leads to a transfer of resources across segmentation lines, there exist equilibria in which sunspots affect consumption. The primary result is that there i...
