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作者：Safra, Z; Segal, U
作者单位：Tel Aviv University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Constant risk aversion means that adding a constant to all outcomes of two distributions, or multiplying all their outcomes by the same positive number, will not change the preference relation between them. We prove several representation theorems, where constant risk aversion is combined with other axioms to imply specific functional forms. Among other things, we obtain a form of disappointment aversion theory without using the concept of reference point in the axioms, and a form of the rank ...
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作者：Lopomo, G
作者单位：University of Michigan System; University of Michigan; New York University
摘要：With private and affiliated buyer's values, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within a large family of sequential bidding mechanisms, named Simple Sequential Auctions. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Levine, DK; Martinelli, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：A long-run player, with private information about how long the game will last, must precommit to an action and faces a sequence of short-run players who get a noisy signal of that action. Since noise vanishes with time, we might expect a long-lived long-run player to behave as a Stackelberg leader. If so, short-run players may end up ignoring the signal. Then, however, the long-run player would have no reason to actually choose the Stackelberg action. We show that this paradox can be resolved ...
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作者：Chakravarty, SR
作者单位：Indian Statistical Institute; Indian Statistical Institute Kolkata; Universite PSL; Ecole Normale Superieure (ENS)
摘要：This paper considers the Debreu-Farrell-Fare measure of efficiency of merger to compare economic efficiencies of alternative merged entities in a homogeneous good industry. The comparability results rely on concentration curve dominance relation and identify the class of cost functions for which efficiency ranking of the entities becomes unambiguous. The results have been developed under alternative assumptions about the total output and number of firms of the merging subgroups. (C) 1998 Acade...
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作者：Chen, XH; White, H
作者单位：University of Chicago; University of California System; University of California San Diego
摘要：Recently macroeconomists and game theorists have dropped the mutual consistency assumption for rational expectations equilibrium (REE) or Nash equilibrium (NE), considering instead plausible adaptive agent learning behaviors yielding sensible REE or NE. But when agents do not have detailed knowledge of the relevant equilibrium relations, they can easily arrive at incorrect belief equilibria which are not rational and have no optimality properties [14]. REE and NE thus lose plausibility as outc...
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作者：Jovanovic, B; Ueda, M
作者单位：New York University; Pompeu Fabra University
摘要：We study a monetary system in which final goods sell on spot markets, while labor and dividends sell through contracts. Firms and workers confuse absolute and relative price changes: A positive price-level shock makes sellers think they are producing better goods than they really are. They split this apparent windfall with workers who get a higher real wage. Hence, unexpected inflation shifts real income from firms (the principals) to workers (the agents), and thereby lowers stock-returns. A p...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); University of Pittsburgh
摘要：This note presents a condition which guarantees the existence of a Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism with budget balance when agents have quasi-linear utility functions. This condition requires correlation among agents' private signals (types), and is (1) simple and easy to verify, (2) good for any decision rule whether efficient or not, (3) valid even if agents' types are mutually payoff-relevant, and (4) true for almost every probability distribution of agents' types. (C) 1998 Academic...
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作者：Ching, S; Serizawa, S
作者单位：Shiga University of Medical Science; University of Osaka
摘要：In a recent paper, Sprumont (1991, Econometrica 59, 509-519) showed that the uniform rule (Benassy, 1982, The Economics of Market Disequilibrium, Academic Press, 1982) is the only rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity, and efficiency on the single-peaked domain (Black, 1948, J. Polit. Econ. 56, 23-34). This result motivates us to investigate whether there is a larger domain on which there exists a nontrivial strategy-proof rule. We want such a domain to be as large as possible. We show...
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作者：DeMarzo, P; Skiadas, C
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Berkeley; Northwestern University
摘要：We identify and analyze a class of economies with asymmetric information that we call quasi-complete. For quasi-complete economies we determine equilibrium trades, show that the set of fully informative equilibria is a singleton, and give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of partially informative equilibria. Besides unifying some familiar settings, such as those of Grossman (1976) and Milgrom and Stokey (1982), the following new results are proved: (a) The same restrictions...
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作者：Bisin, A
作者单位：New York University
摘要：The present paper studies a class of general equilibrium economies with imperfectly competitive financial intermediaries and price-taking consumers. Intermediaries optimally choose the securities they issue and the bid-ask spread they charge. Financial intermediation is costly, and hence markets are endogenously incomplete. An appropriate equilibrium concept is developed, and existence is proved. Competitive equilibria for this class of economies display full indexation of securities payoffs a...
