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作者：Rajan, U
作者单位：Carnegie Mellon University
摘要：The Bayesian approach to game theory is extended to a setting where players can believe that other players may tremble with infinitesimal probability. Here too, a player's type induces a probability distribution over Ether players' types. Two axioms of near rationality are introduced. Almost common knowledge of near rationality implies a strategy choice that survives one round of weak dominance followed by iterated strict dominance. Common knowledge of hierarchical rationality leads to iterate...
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作者：Boylan, RT
作者单位：Washington University (WUSTL)
摘要：A new condition is shown to be necessary and sufficient for Coalition-Proof Nash equilibrium (CPNE) implementation in environments with complete information. This result implies that all choice functions are CPNE-implementable when individuals' utility functions are bounded with respect to all variables-except for money-and are either analytic or quasi-linear. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Carrillo, JD
作者单位：Universite Libre de Bruxelles
摘要：We analyze the gains of coordinating decisions in a regulatory Framework in which agents are sovereign and tax inducements are socially costly. We consider a general multi-agent situation with externalities among agents, incomplete information, and type-dependent reservation utilities. When the regulator (optimally) leaves informational rents to the most efficient agents, centralized coordination reduces global activity. Coordination induces more activity when the principal (optimally) leaves ...
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作者：Sandroni, A
作者单位：Northwestern University
摘要：In this paper I consider a dynamically complete market model without intrinsic uncertainty. The only uncertainty is modelled by sunspots. Agents' beliefs are heterogeneous, but eventually become homogeneous in the sense that agents' beliefs are identical in the limit. I show that if some states of nature occur rarely, then arbitrarily large market crashes may occur infinitely often. This result contrasts with Cass and Shell's (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983), 193-227) results which show that when be...
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作者：Weder, M
作者单位：Humboldt University of Berlin
摘要：This paper develops a three sector dynamic general equilibrium model with the specific aim of evaluating the role of consumer durables in the generation and propagation of business cycles. The model displays indeterminacy at commonly considered realistic parameter restrictions and basically constant returns to scale. If calibrated at modest increasing returns to scale, the sunspots driven model version produces a close match to moments of aggregate U.S. data. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者：Makowski, L; Ostroy, JM
作者单位：University of California System; University of California Davis; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：In a model of an exchange economy with a continuum of individuals, we show that competitive equilibrium can be regarded as resulting from the elimination of arbitrage opportunities. Generically, the elimination of such opportunities results in a phenomenon we call the flattening effect of large numbers. The flattening effect provides a precise meaning to the statement that under perfect competition individuals cannot influence prices; they face perfectly elastic demands and supplies. The attra...
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作者：Cremer, J; Khalil, F; Rochet, JC
作者单位：Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS); Institut Universitaire de France; University of Southampton; University of Washington; University of Washington Seattle
摘要：In a Baron-Myerson setup, we study a situation where an agent is initially uninformed, but can, at a cost, acquire information about the state of nature before the principal offers him a contract. For intermediate values of the cost of acquiring information, the agent's equilibrium strategy will be a mixed strategy: He will acquire information with a probability strictly between 0 and 1. We identify the contract that the principal will offer to such a maybe informed agent. (C) 1998 Academic Pr...
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作者：Sprumont, Y
作者单位：Universite de Montreal; Universite de Montreal
摘要：We ask how the best known mechanisms for solving cost sharing problems with homogeneous cost functions-the value, proportional, and serial mechanisms-should be extended to arbitrary problems. We propose the Ordinality axiom, which requires that cost shares should be invariant under (essentially) all increasing transformations of the measuring scales. Following the value approach first, we present an axiomatization of the Shapley-Shubik rule based on Ordinality. Next, we define and axiomatize t...
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作者：Franke, G; Stapleton, RC; Subrahmanyam, MG
作者单位：University of Konstanz; Lancaster University; New York University
摘要：In this paper, we derive an equilibrium in which some investors buy call/put options on the market portfolio while others sell them. Since investors are assumed to have similar risk-averse preferences, the demand for these contracts is not explained by differences in the shape of utility functions. Rather, it is the degree to which agents face other, non-hedgeable, background risks that determines their risk-taking behavior in the model. We show that investors with low or no background risk ha...
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作者：Fudenberg, D; Levine, D; Pesendorfer, W
作者单位：Harvard University; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; Princeton University
摘要：We examine games played by a single large player and a large number of opponents who are small, but not anonymous. if the Flay of the small players is observed with noise, and if the number of actions the large player controls is bounded as the number of small players grows, the equilibrium set converges to that of the grime where there is a continuum of small players. This paper extends previous work on the negligibility of small players by dropping the assumption that small players' actions ...
