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作者:Lahiri, A; Puhakka, M
作者单位:University of California System; University of California Los Angeles; University of Helsinki
摘要:This paper analyzes the implications of habit persistance preferences for savings and equilibrium dynamics in the contest of an overlapping generations model under pure exchange. We show that habit persistence can convert an economy which otherwise has no role for government currency into an economy where there does exist a role for such currency. Further. the increased saving induced by habit persistence implies that governments are able to float higher levels of deficits in such economies re...
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作者:Alvarez, F; Stokey, NL
作者单位:University of Chicago
摘要:We show that the basic existence, uniqueness, and convergence results of dynamic programming hold when the return function is homogeneous of degree 0 less than or equal to 1 and the constraints are homogeneous of degree one. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者:Pesendorfer, M
作者单位:Yale University
摘要:Agents have to decide whether a polluting plant will be operated or not. Agents' disutility (cost) from pollution is privately known, but correlated across agents. Incentive compatible mechanisms are characterized under the assumption that transfer payments are non-negative. The implementability constraint is similar to the independence case, except that virtual utilities are diminished by a factor due to the correlation of agents' types. As correlation vanishes, the implementability constrain...
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作者:Pakes, A; Ericson, R
作者单位:Yale University; National Bureau of Economic Research; Columbia University
摘要:This paper considers two models of firm behavior that allow for heterogeneity among firms, idiosyncratic (or firm-specific) sources of uncertainty, and discrete outcomes (exit and/or entry). Both the characteristics of firm level panel data sets and the nature of the questions we characteristically ask of them imply that models with these features are likely to underlie most detailed empirical work on microdata sets. The models we consider are a Bayesian learning model due to Jovanovic [20], a...
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作者:Irmen, A; Thisse, JF
作者单位:University of Lausanne; Universite Catholique Louvain; Institut Polytechnique de Paris; Ecole des Ponts ParisTech
摘要:Lancasterian models of product differentiation typically assume a one-dimensional characteristics space. We show that standard results on prices and locations no longer hold when firms compete in a multi-characteristics space. In the location game with n characteristics, firms choose to maximize differentiation in the dominant characteristic and to minimize differentiation in the others when Ihc salience coefficient of the former is sufficiently large, Thus, the principle of minimum differenti...
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作者:Kerschbamer, R; Maderner, N
作者单位:University of Vienna; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK
摘要:This paper studies a discrete formulation of the screening model with type-dependent reservation utilities. II closes the pap between various pooling results derived in continuous-type models and the separating results obtained for the binary case. We show that binary models do not capture the most interesting features of general models with countervailing incentives. However, as soon as at least three types are introduced all interesting results of the continuum case can be replicated in a di...
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作者:Grandmont, JM
作者单位:Institut Polytechnique de Paris; ENSAE Paris; Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS)
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作者:Oloriz, E; Candeal, JC; Indurain, E
作者单位:Universidad Publica de Navarra; University of Zaragoza
摘要:We obtain a full characterization of the representability of interval orders by a pair of real-valued functions. (C) 1998 Academic Press.
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作者:Shitovitz, B; Spiegel, M
作者单位:University of Haifa
摘要:In this paper, we derive qualitative and asymptotic results on Cournot-Nash and Lindahl equilibria in pure public good economies. In a discrete finite economy with similar consumers (e.g., sharing the same Cobb-Douglas utility), we show that the consumer with the biggest initial endowment prefers the proportional Lindahl over his Cournot-Nash bundle. The asymptotic results are derived using a model of a mixed economy with an atomless sector of consumers as an idealization for economies with fe...
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作者:Goenka, A; Kelly, DL; Spear, SE
作者单位:University of Essex; University of Miami; Carnegie Mellon University
摘要:This paper examines an overlapping generations version of the Shapley-Shubik market game. We show existence of equilibria for the simple one commodity model and analyze the dynamics of the equilibrium trajectories generated in the model. Because of the non-linearities generated by strategic interaction of agents in the model, we find that complex and chaotic equilibrium dynamics are possible in this model for a much broader range of preferences than those for which Grandmont (Econometrica 53, ...