Detecting failures of backward induction: Monitoring information search in sequential bargaining

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Johnson, EJ; Camerer, C; Sen, S; Rymon, T
• 署名单位: Columbia University; California Institute of Technology; Boston University; Reichman University
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2850
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 16-47
• 关键词: Bargaining; Experimental economics; bounded rationality; behavioral economics; Behavioral game theory; fairness; limited cognition

摘要

We did experiments in a three-round bargaining game where the (perfect) equilibrium offer was $1.25 and an equal split was $2.50. The average offer was $2.11. Patterns of information search (measured with a computerized information display) show limited lookahead rather than backward induction, Equilibrium theories which adjust for social utilities (reflecting inequality-aversion or reciprocity) cannot explain the results because they predict subjects will make equilibrium offers to robot players, but offers to robots are only a little lower. When trained subjects (who quickly learned to do backward induction) bargained with untrained subjects, offers ended up halfway between equilibrium and $2.11. (C) 2002 Elsevier (USA).