Campaign spending with office-seeking politicians, rational voters, and multiple lobbies

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Prat, A
• 署名单位: University of London; London School Economics & Political Science; Tilburg University; Centre for Economic Policy Research - UK; University of London; London School Economics & Political Science
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2793
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 162-189
• 关键词: Campaign finance; common agency; ELECTIONS

摘要

I introduce a microfounded model of campaign finance with office-seeking politicians, a continuum of voters, and a large number of heterogeneous lobbies. Lobbies make contributions to politicians according to a common agency framework. Politicians use contributions to finance their electoral expenditures. Voters are not Cooled by electoral expenditures: they are influenced in a way that is consistent with the equilibrium behavior of lobbies and politicians. The model is used to: (i) determine the relation between campaign spending and the deviation from the median voter's preferred policy: (ii) show the informational value of lobbies' contributions: (iii) evaluate the welfare implications of restricting campaign spending; and (iv) interpret the empirical finding that campaign expenditures have a very low effect on election outcome. Although in equilibrium advertising provides voters with useful information. under reasonable parameter values, a ban on campaign contributions makes the median voter better off. (C) 2001 Elsevier Science (USA).