Asymptotic revenue equivalence in auctions

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Bali, V; Jackson, M
• 署名单位: Michigan State University; California Institute of Technology
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1006/jeth.2001.2870
• 发表日期: 2002
• 页码: 161-176
• 关键词: Auctions; revenue equivalence; mechanisms

摘要

We study the revenue in auctions of a single object when the number of bidders becomes large. We show that all sequences of auctions belonging to a class of mechanisms have limiting expected revenue equal to the expected best-use value of the object. An important special case that is covered is common value auctions, but more generally not even affiliation of values is assumed. This provides an asymptotic revenue equivalence result for settings beyond that of private values. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA).