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作者：Bergemann, D; Välimäki, J
作者单位：Yale University; Aalto University; University of Southampton
摘要：A general model of dynamic common agency with symmetric information is considered. The set of truthful Markov perfect equilibrium payoffs is characterized and the efficiency properties of the equilibria are established. A condition for the uniqueness of equilibrium payoffs is derived for the static and the dynamic game. The payoff is unique if and only if the payoff of each principal coincides with his marginal contribution to the social value of the game. The dynamic model is applied to a gam...
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作者：Kubler, F
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：This paper examines whether general equilibrium models of exchange economies with incomplete financial markets impose restrictions on prices of commodities and assets given the stochastic processes of dividends and aggregate endowments. We show that the assumption of time-separable expected utility implies restriction on the cross-section of asset prices as well as on spot commodity prices. However, a relaxation of the assumption of time separability will generally destroy these restriction. (...
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作者：Huang, M
作者单位：Stanford University
摘要：We study an equilibrium in which agents face surprise liquidity shocks and invest in liquid and illiquid riskless assets. The random holding horizon from liquidity shocks makes the return of the illiquid security risky. The equilibrium premium for such risk depends on the constraint that agents face when borrowing against future income; it is insignificant without borrowing constraint, but can be very high with borrowing constraint. Illiquidity, therefore, can have large effects on asset retur...
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作者：Maniquet, F
作者单位：University of Namur
摘要：A set of agents stand to receive a service. No two agents can be served simultaneously. A queue has to be organized, and agents having to wait should receive monetary compensations. We characterize the rule assigning positions in the queue and compensations corresponding to the payoffs recommended by the Shapley value of the associated cooperative game. We use a property of independence with respect to increase in some agents' impatience, and an equal responsibility property. (C) 2003 Elsevier...
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作者：Bester, H; Petrakis, E
作者单位：Free University of Berlin; University of Crete
摘要：We describe the evolution of productivity growth in a competitive industry with free entry and exit. The exogenous wage rate determines the firms' engagement in labor productivity enhancing process innovation. There is a unique steady state of the industry dynamics, which is globally asymptotically stable. In the steady state, the number of active firms, their unit labor cost and supply depend on the growth rate but not on the level of the wage rate. In addition to providing comparative static...
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作者：Ferreira, JL
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and se...
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作者：Matros, A
作者单位：University of London; University College London
摘要：Saez-Marti and Weibull (J. Econom. Theory 86 (1999) 268) investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's (J. Econom. Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce cleverness of players. I analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games and show Young's (Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998) prediction to be robust: adaptive learning with clev...
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作者：Green, EJ; Lin, P
作者单位：Lingnan University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
摘要：In a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model, the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. 12 (1988) 3)), the truth-telling equilibrium implemen...
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作者：Laing, D; Palivos, T; Wang, P
作者单位：Vanderbilt University; Pennsylvania Commonwealth System of Higher Education (PCSHE); Pennsylvania State University; Pennsylvania State University - University Park; Louisiana State University System; Louisiana State University; University of Ioannina; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：We construct a dynamic general-equilibrium model of search and matching where public knowledge grows through time and workers accumulate a fraction of this knowledge through education/retraining. Due to search delays, the unemployment pool is populated by vintages of workers of differing productivities. Through intergenerational rivalry, the human capital of older generations is rendered obsolete relative to that of the new blood. Higher knowledge growth exacerbates intergenerational competiti...
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作者：Gagnon, G
作者单位：Toronto Metropolitan University
摘要：This paper examines whether a small random deviation from a non-random policy process will destabilize the equilibrium exchange rate. The results focus on exchange rate dynamics when the government maintains a target zone or makes unanticipated deviations from a policy rule. With rational expectations small random shocks do not create large deviations from the policy rule exchange rate. If agents are approximately rational large deviations between exchange rates are possible. (C) 2003 Elsevier...
