Clever agents in adaptive learning

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Matros, A
• 署名单位: University of London; University College London
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00068-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 110-124
• 关键词: evolution; game theory; bounded rationality; Markov chain; stochastic stability

摘要

Saez-Marti and Weibull (J. Econom. Theory 86 (1999) 268) investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's (J. Econom. Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce cleverness of players. I analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games and show Young's (Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998) prediction to be robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategy distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.