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作者：Fishman, A; Rob, R
作者单位：University of Pennsylvania; Bar Ilan University
摘要：We develop a model of firm size, based on the hypothesis that consumers are locked in, because of search costs, with firms they have patronized in the past. As a consequence, older firms have a larger clientele and are able to extract higher profits. The equilibrium of this model yields: (i) A downward sloping density of firm sizes. (ii) Older firms are less likely to exit than younger firms. (iii) Larger firms spend more on RD. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Kalai, G
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：In this paper we study the learnability of the class of rationalizable choice functions using the basic concept of PAC-learnability from statistical learning theory. We prove that the class of rationalizable choice functions on N alternatives is learnable from O(N) examples and is optimal in terms of PAC-learnability among classes which are invariant under permutations of the elements. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Peters, M
作者单位：University of Toronto
摘要：This paper contrasts models of common agency in which principals compete in incentive contracts (that is, they make take it or leave it offers) with models where principals offer agents menus of incentive contracts from which the final contract is negotiated. It is shown that pure strategy equilibria in incentive contracts are robust to the possibility that principals might offer menus. In addition, a no-externalities condition is given such that any pure strategy equilibrium allocation with m...
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作者：Wärneryd, K
作者单位：Stockholm School of Economics
摘要：We consider two-player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value. For settings where one player knows the value of the prize, while the other only knows its prior distribution, we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent. In the special case of a lottery contest, equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed. (C) 2003 E...
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作者：Govindan, S; Wilson, R
作者单位：Stanford University; Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：A new algorithm is presented for computing Nash equilibria of finite games. Using Kohlberg and Mertens' structure theorem we show that a homotopy method can be represented as a dynamical system and implemented by Smale's global Newton method. The algorithm is outlined and computational experience is reported. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.
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作者：Messner, M; Polborn, MK
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario); Pompeu Fabra University; Bocconi University
摘要：This paper builds on Cremer's (Quart. J. Econ. 101 (1986) 33) seminal analysis which shows that (almost) complete cooperation can be achieved as an equilibrium in a game played by overlapping generations of players if the institution in which players cooperate is infinitely lived. We analyze a similar model in which the costs of cooperation are subject to random shocks. Even if these random shocks are very small, the range of parameters for which cooperation can be sustained is decreased consi...
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作者：Beaudry, P; González, FM
作者单位：University of British Columbia; National Bureau of Economic Research
摘要：This paper shows how the interaction between decentralized information gathering and discreteness of investment decisions at the individual level can generate random fluctuations in aggregate investment that involve occasionally large allocation errors. This interaction is illustrated in a model in which private information is costly to acquire and prices reveal information. The unique rational expectations equilibrium outcome of the model is shown to always be noisy and characterized by inves...
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作者：Al-Najjar, NI; Casadesus-Masanell, R; Ozdenoren, E
作者单位：Northwestern University; Harvard University; University of Michigan System; University of Michigan
摘要：We introduce a framework to study individuals' behavior in environments that are deterministic, but too complex to permit tractable deterministic representations. An agent in these environments uses a probabilistic model to cope with his inability to think through all contingencies in advance. We interpret this probabilistic model as embodying all patterns the agent perceives, yet allowing for the possibility that there may be important details he had missed. Although the implied behavior is r...
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作者：Peralta-Alva, A
作者单位：University of Minnesota System; University of Minnesota Twin Cities
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作者：Jackson, MO; Palfrey, TR
作者单位：California Institute of Technology
