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作者：Levy, M
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem
摘要：We formulate a general stochastic process of wealth accumulation by capital investment and analyze the conditions required to ensure convergence to the empirically observed Pareto wealth distribution. While homogeneous investment talent leads to the Pareto distribution under very general conditions, even a mild degree of differential investment talent results in a non-Pareto wealth distribution. This finding suggests that chance, rather than differential investment talent, is the dominant fact...
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作者：Ng, MC
作者单位：Academia Sinica - Taiwan
摘要：In an abstract model with asymmetric information, we show that there is a duality relationship between the prior beliefs and trading demands of bets for any given individual. Then we aggregate all the agents to obtain a second duality relationship between common prior beliefs and trading possibilities. We easily derive from these relationships the no trade theorem and its converse. General efficiency results can be obtained. Moreover, our framework is sufficiently general to cover special case...
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作者：Blouin, MR
作者单位：University of Quebec; University of Quebec Montreal
摘要：I analyze a market in which a price-taking buyer buys a variable-quality good from a population of sellers, contrasting the case where quality is a seller's private information to that where it is public information. Average quality traded under private information can be either higher (quality oversupply) or lower (quality undersupply) than under public information, depending on sellers' preferences. We are likely to see quality undersupply if (i) sellers' preferences exhibit substitutability...
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作者：Roche, H
作者单位：Instituto Tecnologico Autonomo de Mexico
摘要：We re-examine the representative agent's optimal consumption and savings under uncertainty in the presence of investment constraints using martingale representation and convex analysis techniques. This framework allows us to explicitly quantify precautionary savings which induces a higher average growth rate than in a certainty setup. We provide a closed form solution for a Cobb-Douglas economy. The effect of uncertainty on portfolio selection is analyzed. Consumption growth rate and risk free...
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作者：Aoyagi, M
作者单位：University of Osaka
摘要：This paper studies bidder collusion with communication in repeated auctions when no side transfer is possible. It presents a simple dynamic bid rotation scheme which coordinates bids based on communication history and enables intertemporal transfer of bidders' payoffs. The paper derives a sufficient condition for such a dynamic scheme to be an equilibrium and characterizes the equilibrium payoffs in a general environment with affiliated signals and private or interdependent values. With IPV, i...
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作者：Konishi, H; Ray, D
作者单位：New York University; Boston College; Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas (CSIC); CSIC - Institut d'Analisi Economica (IAE)
摘要：We study coalition formation as an ongoing, dynamic process, with payoffs generated as coalitions form, disintegrate, or regroup. A process of coalition formation (PCF) is an equilibrium if a coalitional move to some other state can be justified by the expectation of higher future value, compared to inaction. This future value, in turn, is endogenous: it depends on coalitional movements at each node. We study existence of equilibrium PCFs. We connect deterministic equilibrium PCFs with unique ...
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作者：Frankel, DM; Morris, S; Pauzner, A
作者单位：Cornell University; Yale University; Tel Aviv University
摘要：We study games with strategic complementarities, arbitrary numbers of players and actions, and slightly noisy payoff signals. We prove limit uniqueness: as the signal noise vanishes, the game has a unique strategy profile that survives iterative dominance. This generalizes a result of Carlsson and van Damme (Econometrica 61 (1993) 989-1018) for two-player, two-action games. The surviving profile, however, may depend on fine details of the structure of the noise. We provide sufficient condition...
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作者：Demichelis, S; Ritzberger, K
摘要：A connected component of Nash equilibria is (dynamically) potentially stable if there exits an evolutionary selection dynamics from a broad class for which the component is asymptotically stable. A necessary condition for potential stability is that the component's index agrees with its Euler characteristic. Second, if the latter is nonzero, the component contains a strategically stable set. If the Enter characteristic would be zero, the dynamics (that justifies potential stability) could be s...
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作者：Jerez, B
作者单位：Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
摘要：We show that incentive efficient allocations in economies with adverse selection and moral hazard problems can be determined as optimal solutions to a linear programming problem and we use duality theory to obtain a complete characterization of the optima. Our dual analysis identifies welfare effects associated with the incentives of the agents to truthfully reveal their private information. Because these welfare effects may generate non-convexities, incentive efficient allocations may involve...
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作者：Abdulkadiroglu, A; Sönmez, T
作者单位：Koc University; Columbia University
摘要：Using lotteries is a common tool for allocating indivisible goods. Since obtaining preferences over lotteries is often difficult, real-life mechanisms usually rely on ordinal preferences over deterministic outcomes. Bogomolnaia and Moulin (J. Econom. Theory 19 (2002) 623) show that the outcome of an ex post efficient mechanism may be stochastically dominated They define a random assignment to be ordinally efficient if and only if it is not stochastically dominated. In this paper we investigate...
