Strategic interaction between futures and spot markets

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Ferreira, JL
• 署名单位: Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00012-1
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 141-151
• 关键词: futures markets; Cournot competition; collusion

摘要

We study an oligopolistic industry where firms are able to sell in a futures market at infinitely many moments prior to the spot market. A kind of Folk-theorem is established: any outcome between perfect competition and Cournot can be sustained in equilibrium. We then find that the Cournot outcome can be sustained by a renegotiation-proof equilibrium. However, this is not true for the competitive outcome. Furthermore, only the monopolistic outcome is renegotiation-proof if firms can buy and sell in the futures market. These results suggest, contrary to existing literature, that the introduction of futures markets may have an anti-competitive effect. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.