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作者：Amir, R; Lambson, VE
作者单位：Brigham Young University; Universite Catholique Louvain; Universite Catholique Louvain
摘要：An infinite-horizon, stochastic model of entry and exit with sunk costs and imperfect competition is constructed. A subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the general dynamic stochastic game is shown to exist as a limit of finite-horizon equilibria. This equilibrium has a relatively simple structure characterized by two numbers per finite history. Under very general conditions, it tends to exhibit excessive entry and insufficient exit relative to a social optimum. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (USA)...
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作者：Kovalenkov, A; Wooders, M
作者单位：University of Warwick; University of North Carolina; University of North Carolina Chapel Hill
摘要：We introduce the framework of parameterized collections of games with and without sidepayments and provide three nonemptiness of approximate core theorems. The parameters bound (a) the number of approximate types of players and the size of the approximation and (b) the size of nearly effective groups of players and their distance from exact effectiveness. Our theorems are based on a new notion of partition-balanced profiles and approximately partition-balanced profiles. The results are applied...
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作者：Austen-Smith, D
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作者：Conlon, JR
作者单位：University of Mississippi
摘要：This paper considers learning rates in finitely repeated prisoners' dilemmas. If players think their opponents might be relatively cooperative (e.g., tit-for-tat or grim types), they will cooperate in finitely repeated prisoners' dilemmas (see Kreps et al., J. Econom. Theory 27 (1982) 245). However, if there are actually no cooperative types, players will eventually learn this and cooperation will break down. This paper shows that this learning is extremely slow, so it will take an extremely l...
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作者：Evans, GW; Honkapohja, S
作者单位：University of Oregon; University of Helsinki
摘要：We examine the nonlinear model x(l) = ElF(x(l+1)). Markov stationary sunspot equilibria (SSEs) exist near an indeterminate steady state, (x) over cap = F((x) over cap), provided \F'(x) over cap \ > 1. Despite the importance of indeterminacy in macroeconomics, earlier results have not provided conditions for the existence of adaptively stable SSEs near an indeterminate steady state. We show that there exist Markov SSEs near (x) over cap that are E-stable, and therefore locally stable under adap...
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作者：Ben-Porath, E
作者单位：Hebrew University of Jerusalem; Tel Aviv University
摘要：The paper studies Bayesian games which are extended by adding pre-play communication. Let Gamma be a Bayesian game with full support and with three or more players. The main result is that if players can send private messages to each other and make public announcements then every communication equilibrium outcome, q, that is rational (i.e., involves probabilities that are rational numbers) can be implemented in a sequential equilibrium of a cheap talk extension of Gamma, provided that the foll...
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作者：Cho, SJ; Duggan, J
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of Rochester
摘要：We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a minimal stationary equilibrium and of a maximal stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (nonquadratic) utilities. (C) 2003 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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作者：Epstein, LG; Schneider, M
作者单位：University of Rochester; University of California System; University of California Los Angeles
摘要：This paper axiomatizes an intertemporal version of multiple-priors utility. A central axiom is dynamic consistency, which leads to a recursive structure for utility, to 'rectangular' sets of priors and to prior-by-prior Bayesian updating as the updating rule for such sets of priors. It is argued that dynamic consistency is intuitive in a wide range of situations and that the model is consistent with a rich set of possibilities for dynamic behavior under ambiguity. (C) 2003 Elsevier Science (US...
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作者：Robson, AJ
作者单位：Western University (University of Western Ontario)
摘要：Strategic rationality is subjected here to natural selection. In a zero-sum repeated game of incomplete information, one long-run individual is informed of the state of the world, and plays against a sequence of short-run opponents who are not. Strategies are noisy and have bounded recall. An equilibrium in these is shown to exist. Relative to any such equilibrium, sufficiently greater recall enjoys an advantage that is not decreasing in the original level of recall, thus capturing the Red Que...
