Implementing efficient allocations in a model of financial intermediation

• 成果类型: Article
• 署名作者: Green, EJ; Lin, P
• 署名单位: Lingnan University; Federal Reserve System - USA; Federal Reserve Bank - Chicago
• 刊物名称: JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC THEORY
• ISSN/ISSBN: 0022-0531
• DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(02)00017-0
• 发表日期: 2003
• 页码: 1-23
• 关键词: Financial intermediation; Bank run; implementation

摘要

In a finite-trader version of the Diamond and Dybvig (J. Polit. Econ. 91 (1983) 401) model, the ex ante efficient allocation is implementable by a direct mechanism (i.e., each trader announces the type of his own ex post preference) in which truthful revelation is the strictly dominant strategy for each trader. When the model is modified by formalizing the sequential-service constraint (cf. Wallace (Fed. Reserve Bank Minneapolis Quart. Rev. 12 (1988) 3)), the truth-telling equilibrium implements the symmetric, ex ante efficient allocation with respect to iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. (C) 2002 Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.